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FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 20, 1991

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FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1991

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Members present: Charles B. Rangel, chairman, Lawrence Coughlin, Tom Lewis, James M. Inhofe, Ron de Lugo, William F. Clinger, Jr., George Hochbrueckner, Donald M. Payne, Robert E. Andrews, Michael G. Oxley, Jim Ramstad, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Christopher Shays, Howard Coble, Benjamin A. Gilman, and Frank J. Guarini.

Staff present: Edward H. Jurith, staff director; Peter J. Coniglio, minority staff director; James Alexander, press secretary; Richard Baum, professional staff; Linda Bloss, staff assistant; Jennifer Ann Brophy, professional staff; George R. Gilbert, staff counsel; Rebecca L. Hedlund, professional staff; Marianne Koepf, staff assistant; and Melanie T. Young, minority professional staff.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, CHAIRMAN

Mr. RANGEL. The committee will come to order.

We will start this hearing on probably the most important and most difficult part of the struggle against drug abuse. We talk a lot about supply and source, prevention, education, treatment, and enforcement, but I guess most American people want to know what we are doing to stop drugs from coming into the United States. As I said on the Ways and Means Committee, seeing all of the new agreements that we are entering into such as removing the barriers from free trade, it just looks like a drug dealer's delight to see that there will be more commerce and more opportunities for them to bring their poisons into the United States.

In any event, we have to maintain a strong Federal drug interdiction program. And this morning we will be hearing from the Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service. I am particularly glad that we have Assistant Secretary Duncan here before us. At a recent select committee field trip prior to the Persian Gulf crisis, we were impressed with the effectiveness and the assumption of responsibilities that the Department of Defense has taken. It was really an outstanding job of coordinating intelligence, working with our military, and working with the other agencies with responsibilities.

We do know that as a result of the Persian Gulf crisis, a lot of the equipment, time, the effort and the resources had to be attracted to the Middle East. We do hope that your testimony would indicate that a lot of that is back on line.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Rangel follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT

OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL

CHAIRMAN

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

HEARING ON

FEDERAL INTERDICTION EFFORTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1991

GOOD MORNING. OUR PURPOSE THIS MORNING IS TO EXAMINE THE SUCCESS OF FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, AND THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE. SPECIFICALLY, WE WANT TO RECEIVE THE ASSESSMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY STEPHEN DUNCAN OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM P. LEAHY, JR. OF THE COAST GUARD, AND MR. THOMAS MCDERMOTT OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE, REGARDING THE LATEST TRENDS IN DRUG TRAFFICKING, CURRENT STRATEGIES OF THE VARIOUS INTERDICTION AGENCIES, AND WHAT OUR INTERDICTION EFFORTS ARE ACCOMPLISHING.

THE ONLY CONSTANT IN DRUG SMUGGLING OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN CHANGE. FOR EXAMPLE, AS INTERDICTION PRESSURE WAS INCREASED IN THE SOUTHEAST IN THE 1980'S, SMUGGLERS ADAPTED. THEY SWITCHED FROM BULKY MARIJUANA TO MORE COMPACT COCAINE, THEY STARTED USING AIR DROPS OUT AT SEA, AND THEY TARGETED OUR LONG, UNPROTECTED BORDER WITH MEXICO, WHILE CONTINUING TO PLY DRUGS THROUGH THE HOLES IN OUR SOUTHEAST DEFENSES. STEPPED UP ENFORCEMENT ON OUR SOUTHWEST BORDER AS WELL AS INCREASED ANTI-DRUG PATROLS BY MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IN NORTHERN MEXICO HAVE DETERRED CLANDESTINE AIR TRAFFICKING IN THE SOUTHWEST BUT PROMPTED SMUGGLERS TO ESTABLISH NEW BASES OF OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, DEVELOP LAND

ROUTES THROUGH MEXICO, AND CONCEAL MORE AND MORE DRUGS IN CARGO CONTAINERS AND OTHER COMMERCIAL SHIPMENTS. TODAY, THE CARIBBEAN, ESPECIALLY PUERTO RICO, IS A MAJOR TRANSSHIPMENT POINT FOR BOTH COCAINE AND HEROIN DESTINED FOR THE UNITED STATES. HALF OF THE ILLICIT NARCOTICS FOUND IN PUERTO RICO IS HEROIN. ONCE DRUGS ARE SUCCESSFULLY SMUGGLED INTO PUERTO RICO, SMUGGLING TO THE MAINLAND BECOMES MUCH EASIER. AGAIN AND AGAIN, DRUG TRAFFICKERS HAVE ALTERED THEIR SMUGGLING METHODS AND ROUTES TO STAY ONE STEP AHEAD OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES, AND OUR SUCCESSES AGAINST THEM HAVE BEEN TRANSITORY AT BEST.

OVER 200 TONS OF COCAINE WERE SEIZED LAST YEAR IN THE ANDEAN NATIONS, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES. DESPITE THESE RECORD SEIZURES, THE PRICE OF COCAINE HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE OVER THE LAST FEW YEARS, INDICATING THAT THESE SEIZURES HAVE NOT HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE WORLD SUPPLY OR STREET AVAILABILITY OF COCAINE.

IN 1982, TOTAL DOD ANTI-DRUG SPENDING WAS UNDER \$5 MILLION. THE FISCAL YEAR 1991 BUDGET FOR DOD'S DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES IS OVER \$1 BILLION, A 200-FOLD INCREASE IN LESS THAN A DECADE. THIS GROWTH IN DOD'S DRUG BUDGET WAS MANDATED BY THE CONGRESS THROUGH

THE AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS WHICH HAS PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS IN THE POSSE COMITATUS RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY SUPPORT FOR DRUG ENFORCMENT, DIRECTED DOD TO CARRY OUT SPECIFIC ANTI-DRUG MISSIONS FOR DETECTION, MONITORING AND INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION RELATING TO DRUG INTERDICTION, AND PROVIDED THE RESOURCES TO PERFORM THESE NEW RESPONSIBILITIES.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO HAVE MR. DUNCAN WITH US. HE IS THE DESIGNATED SPOKESMAN FOR SECRETARY CHENEY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ON DRUG ABUSE AND TRAFFICKING ISSUES. WHILE IT REMAINS THE INTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM SECRETARY CHENEY ON HIS ROLE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, WE LOOK FORWARD TO MR. DUNCAN GIVING US AN OVERVIEW OF DODS SUPPORT FOR INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES. I ALSO HOPE THAT MR. DUNCAN WILL ADDRESS THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ANDEAN STRATEGY.

THE 1992 BUDGET REQUESTS FOR THE DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES OF THE AGENCIES TESTIFYING TODAY ARE \$1.15 BILLION FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, \$704 MILLION FOR THE COAST GUARD, AND \$663 MILLION FOR

THE CUSTOMS SERVICE. TODAY WE WILL SEE WHAT THE NATION IS RECEIVING FOR THIS INVESTMENT.

GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO BE WITH US TODAY. THE COMMITTEE WELCOMES YOUR ASSESSMENTS OF CURRENT DRUG TRAFFICKING PATTERNS AND APPROPRIATE LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Coughlin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE COUGHLIN

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join in welcoming our witnesses at today's hearings. Certainly drug interdiction is a very important and very expensive element of our national drug control policy. In recent years the Department of Defense has joined in the fight by contributing its substantial expertise and numerous national assets to drug interdiction. The men and women of the Coast Guard and Customs Service have for many years distinguished themselves in defending the Nation from illicit drugs and narcotics. We have certainly made progress, but much remains to be done.

Therefore, I am today introducing with others two bills on the use of force against airborne drug traffickers. I believe strongly that we must fight the war against drugs in a manner which makes it possible to win. Just monitoring drug traffickers is not enough; we have got to stop them.

The first bill, which I initially introduced last year, gives the Coast Guard limited authority to use force against airborne drug traffickers. It is designed to combat a common means of trafficking whereby airborne traffickers fly up the coast of the United States, or to a nearby island, drop drugs to cohorts below, and then turn around and fly away without ever stopping. We frequently capture the whole thing on tape. Our interdiction agencies, with their multimillion dollar assets and excellently trained personnel, do not have the authority to do anything more.

There are 21 safety features in the bill to ensure that only drug traffickers are targeted. The most important are the requirements that, prior to the use of force: First, U.S. authorities must recover and test positive drugs dropped from the plane's hold; and, second, repeated warnings, by various means, are presented to the trafficking plane.

The second bill will provide U.S. military explicit authority to train foreign nationals on how to shoot down drug trafficking planes, and to assist them in the process with intelligence and technical assistance. It prohibits the actual use of such force by U.S. personnel, except in self-defense. Our allies in the drug war, including Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, are already using force against drug trafficking planes. It is only prudent that the U.S. authorities, who are already providing military training and assistance, advise them on how to do it properly so that force is only used when absolutely necessary.

In most of the coca growing areas, air transport is the only way that the processing chemicals can be brought in, and cocaine can be brought out. Thus, the bill, if enacted, could dramatically increase the effectiveness of our overall effort. Assistance in this area would only be provided at the request of the host nation.

I will welcome your thoughts on these proposals as we proceed through the hearings, and welcome you here today.

Mr. RANGEL. Is there any member seeking recognition before the Secretary speaks?

[No response.]

Mr. RANGEL. The Chair sees no one. Thank you again, Assistant Secretary Duncan, for coming before the committee.

We look forward to hearing from Secretary Cheney at some later date, but it is really indeed a pleasure for the committee to have you here, Secretary Duncan.

If there is no objection, your entire testimony will be entered into the record. And you may proceed in testifying as you feel most comfortable.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND DOD COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate your remarks of welcome. Curiously enough, of all of the committees I have testified before, this is the first time I have had the pleasure of testifying before this committee. I look forward to sharing some observations.

Before I get into the meat of my testimony, and my opening remarks at least, permit me to focus on some of the original comments you made about interdiction, so there will be no misunderstanding. Sometimes in the Department of Defense we have trouble with terminology and it starts to confuse policymakers.

We, of course, define "interdiction" as that entire process that starts with the detection of a drug trafficker and results, ultimately, in the arrest of the trafficker and the search and seizure of contraband.

Now, the Armed Forces of the United States have a limited and supporting role, supporting law enforcement agencies. We are limited to the front end of the interdiction process, the detection and the monitoring of illegal drugs. Ultimately at the tail end of the interdiction process, law enforcement agencies have to come into play, since we have no arrest powers, nor do we have authority to make searches and seizures because of the posse comitatus statute.

So with that understanding, let me simply open my remarks by saying that I believe that the role of the Department of Defense, that is, the role that we are playing in the drug fight today, is substantially broader than it was even 2 or 3 years ago. Our missions are complex and they are broad. With the committee's indulgence, and because I did submit a lengthy written statement, I would appreciate it if that statement is included in the record.

The reason I submitted a lengthy statement is because I tried to anticipate your areas of interest and give you some background about how far this Department has come in the last couple of years.

I won't even attempt to summarize that statement, but I would like to direct attention to certain specific things that happened in the last 2 years.

Since the Department is associated with the supply reduction effort so much, with your permission, I would like to at least start with a description of what I think is one of the clear victories in the drug fight today.

Let me see chart No. 1.

[Chart No. 1.]

MILITARY DRUG USE




CHART NO. 1

By way of background, it should be noted that in the late 1970's and the early 1980's, the Department of Defense, like much of the country, had a drug problem. We had too many soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines abusing drugs. Some very courageous military leaders at the time decided that we would have a policy and adopt a policy of a zero tolerance. To effectuate that policy we implemented a policy of random urinalysis testing, and as the committee can see, we have had in excess of an 80-percent decline in drug abuse within the Armed Forces since 1980.

It is a tough program that we have, but I think the fact that that program has been so successful and drug abuse has been reduced from something in the neighborhood of 27 percent to less than 5 percent, as recently as 1988, and that we even continued drug testing during the conflict in Southwest Asia, says volumes about why we have the quality soldiers, sailors, and marines and airmen that we do today.

Let's go on to the next chart.

[Chart No. 2.]

DoD Counterdrug Statutory Missions

- **Detection and Monitoring**
Serve as single lead agency of the Federal Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States
- **C3I**
Integrate into an effective communications network the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs
- **National Guard**
Approve and fund Governors' plans for an enhanced drug interdiction and counterdrug role for the National Guard in "state status"

As the chairman pointed out, the Congress assigned to our department three major new missions with the fiscal year 1989 Defense Authorization Act. These are the statutory missions that were assigned to the Department of Defense by Congress, effective in October 1988.

First, to serve as the single "lead agency" or the Federal Government in the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs.

Second, of course, is the command, control, communications, and intelligence mission, essentially to integrate into a cohesive and effective network, all of the command, control, communications, and intelligence assets of the United States that could be applied to the interdiction process.

And then, finally, the Congress directed the Department to find ways to enhance the use of the National Guard, with the National Guard acting in a State status, a title XXXII status, instead of a title X or Federal status.

Now, I was serving in the Department at that time, but I did not have responsibility for counternarcotics, or counterdrugs policies. I will tell you that when these three missions came in, it was a rather unusual situation from my perspective, because unlike most situations where the Department comes up with a program and makes a budget recommendation to the Congress, here the Congress assigned to the Department three new statutory missions and gave it \$300 million to effectuate and implement those missions. We did not have in place a program to implement the missions.

So there was a lot of scrambling in the fall of 1988, to make sure that we developed the capability to perform these three statutory missions.

One of the first things that happened was an early decision by then Secretary Carlucci as to how we should become engaged actively in interdiction and what kind of command and control system we should use. An early decision was made to use the existing command and control system, the existing commanders in chief, instead of creating a new command, for example, "commander in chief of drugs."


We thought that this was a very important fight and, therefore, we could use the same system that we would use to fight any other important conflict.

Of course, in the fall of 1988, we had the Presidential election and a new administration assumed office in January of 1989. The President made it clear in his first joint address to the Congress, and the committee may remember this, that the Armed Forces were going to be involved in the fight against illegal drugs. It was not entirely clear to us then precisely what the President had in mind, but it was also clear that by September the President had to submit his national drug control strategy. And we were actively engaged in the ensuing months in helping to develop that.

In March 1989, Secretary Cheney assumed office. And in April 1989, he asked me to assume additional responsibilities as the Department's coordinator for drug enforcement policy and support.

Let me see the next chart, if I could.

[Chart No. 3.]



A quick comment about how we organized for this new fight. By the spring of 1989, we were well into the fiscal year with these new statutory missions. I asked the Secretary for additional help. I asked for additional staff support. I am happy to report to the committee that he has given me everything that I have ever asked for in the way of staff support, or whatever else we need, to help implement the President's strategy.

Of course, on September 5, the President announced his new national drug control strategy; this was September 1989. Equally significant almost, for those of us who are involved in the implementation of that strategy, was the announcement by Secretary Cheney on September 18, only 13 days later, of dramatic new Department of Defense counterdrug policies.

I guess sometimes we get sold by rhetoric, but this was not rhetoric. The important thing for all of the people of the Department of Defense was that the Secretary defined this fight against illegal drugs as a "national security" problem, the first time it had been so defined by a Secretary of Defense. Indeed, he stated to the Department that this was now a "high priority national security mission" of the Department of Defense. Those were not words of rhetoric; those were policy statements.

In effect, he was telling all of us in the Department to elevate this new mission, give it high priority, along with other high priority missions. It was not to be business as usual. He said: "Let's make it happen."

He gave a great deal of policy guidance in September 1989. He also asked the various commanders in chief to prepare plans to implement the President's strategy within their respective areas of responsibility and to submit those plans as quickly as possible.

Let's see the next chart, please.

[Chart No. 4.]

Combating the Flow of Drugs

- Source Countries

Focus: The Andean Region. Assist in nation building, training, planning, logistics, equipment, intelligence, and other cooperation with host nation forces

- In Transit

Focus: Detection and Monitoring. Deploy armed forces for "Defense in Depth" to complement and support law enforcement agencies; improve interagency communications, intelligence, and technical assistance

- In the United States

Focus: Support to Law Enforcement. Provide personnel support, including major National Guard activities, active and other reserve components; training, reconnaissance, equipment, C3I support, comprehensive demand reduction activities

The next development of some significance was on November 13, 1989, when we set up Joint Task Force 6 in El Paso, TX, at Fort Bliss.

By November 1989, the policy statement on the chart was the policy that the Secretary had set forth and we were in the business of trying to focus our energies and our resources on it. The Secretary said that we would combat the flow of drugs in three areas: First of all, in the source countries, the Andean region. In the source countries he directed us to assist in nation building, training, building, planning, logistics, equipment, intelligence and, as you see, whatever cooperation might be necessary to give the host nation forces and host nation governments the kind of help that they defined—they defined their needs.

He also directed us to attack the problem in transit, specifically the new detection monitoring mission, deploy the Armed Forces in a "defense-in-depth" concept.

Now, what does that mean?

Basically, the defense-in-depth concept means that we are going to use radar and other sensor assets, such as the Caribbean base and radar network. We are going to build inward with other layers of detection assets, so we can perform the detection and monitoring mission.

Finally, he told us to focus on support to law-enforcement agencies in the United States, to provide all kinds of support. But I must tell you that in the fall of 1989, it was not entirely clear to us just what support the law enforcement agencies needed, because they were only learning how to ask for the support. Sometimes they would define a need and ask for a particular resource and we had another resource that was, perhaps, better to address their need. So, we were learning how to work with the law enforcement agencies.

That was November 1989. The very next month, in December, our Armed Forces were engaged in an armed conflict in Panama called Operation Just Cause. There were lots of things happening in the strategic environment; the Berlin Wall had just come down in November. Our worldwide forces were facing a world that was changing very, very quickly.

In March, we had just wound up Operation Just Cause, March of last year, 1990. I was happy to announce all of the plans that each of the commanders in chief had developed for implementing the President's strategy in their respective areas of responsibility.

In March 1990, also, the Deputy Secretary directed me to prepare the first—and this is significant from the perspective of our planning and budgeting process—directed me to prepare the first program and budget for counterdrugs in the Department of Defense. That is to say, prepare a complex budget, we call it a POM, but basically, to go through the entire budgetary process, just like the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force do. I was happy to submit the programs and budgets in April 1990.

The strategic environment was changing for the Department and we were having to address a new situation worldwide, in the summer of 1990. In August 1990, of course, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Curiously enough, one of the issues that the chairman and Mr. Coughlin are interested in, is the question of the effect that Oper-

ation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had on our counterdrug fight. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2; 2 weeks later, on August 15, we started a period of what we then described as "enhanced detection and monitoring operations Caribbean." I will discuss that in a little bit greater detail in a moment.

We continued that program. We did not slack off. It involved a commitment of a great number of sensor assets, ships, airplanes, and so forth. But, Desert Shield did not affect that at all.

On August 22 of last year, of course, the President authorized the first call up of Reserve Forces since we went to an All-Volunteer Force and the total force policy. The armed conflict started on January 16 this year, Operation Desert Storm. The temporary cease-fire did not take effect until February 28.

So, what does all of this mean for the drug fight in the Department?

We view all of the counterdrug actions that took place in fiscal years 1989 and 1990 as probably something that could be fairly characterized as a "startup" phase. We had new missions and we weren't quite sure how to perform them. For example, in the case of the National Guard, the Congress directed us in the fall of 1988, to use the National Guard more, but to use the National Guard in a State status and pursuant to plans that would be submitted by the individual State Governors. That had not been done before.

The statute required the Governors to submit plans, to propose plans to the Department of Defense, to the Secretary of Defense. If those plans were approved, then the Secretary of Defense was authorized to release dollars to the individual States.

Well, we had to work out a system, just by way of example, of permitting the Governors to know what the costing methodology was, so the State of Minnesota would submit the same costing methodology as the State of Georgia.

We had to work with the States to let them know what our resources were, what the possibilities were. We had to learn what the unique needs of each State were since the needs of New York are different than the needs of Nebraska. What were the unique needs of the States and what could we do to assist them?

We had to break through what I have described as a "clash of operating cultures." We had a lot of professionals in the Armed Forces and a lot of professionals in the law enforcement agencies, but they had not necessarily worked together. They didn't even necessarily have the same communications equipment.

We had to find ways to overcome the operating cultures of the respective agencies, so that we could learn what the law enforcement agencies needed and what we could do to support their needs, without violating the traditions of our Nation, or the law, for example, the posse comitatus statute. We wanted to present the law enforcement agencies with the unique experience, or unique skills that reside in the Department of Defense, and to give them what they needed to effectuate their own goals.

So this was the startup phase in fiscal years 1989 and 1990. We built a staff. We designed policies. We set up command structures. We prepared the first budget. We overcame what I have called the "clash of operating cultures." Mostly what we were doing with our

resources was engaging in a lot of procurement, for example, in connection with the C3I mission.

It was necessary for us to not only design the architecture so that the law enforcement agencies could communicate with the Armed Forces, but it was also necessary for us to provide some seed money so we could buy the same equipment. It is hard to communicate when you have different equipment.

Fiscal year 1991 to date, we have, of course, been fighting the conflict in Southwest Asia, but we have kept the pressure up. We have not slacked off. I am happy and very proud that we can report that we are building on our success of the first 2 years. I have addressed the specific question of how Desert Shield and Desert Storm have affected our drug fight in my written statement, but in summary, permit me to note that we had to shift some assets from time to time. But as we shifted particular kinds of assets to Southwest Asia, we made every effort and we succeeded, in moving other kinds of assets in to fill the gap.


Curiously enough, we still had lots of ships at sea, lots of airplanes in the air, radar sensors still operating. We were doing our best to keep the pressure on, even while we were engaged in a conflict 8,000 miles from American shores.

Now, where are we going from this point on?

Let's see the next chart.

[Chart No. 5.]

DOD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM BY ACTIVITY GROUP



If the first 2 years were the startup phase, I would fairly characterize this as a "maturing" phase. This is generally where we see ourselves going over the next few years. This is the budget that I recommended to the House Armed Services Committee.

You will see that in the case of detection and monitoring, the blue color, starting with fiscal year 1989, continues to grow at a rather significant rate. We will continue to spend significant resources to help National Guard units in their respective States performing in a State status.

You will see that the red will decrease a little bit because having provided seed money so the law enforcement agencies can now pick up the slack budgetary-wise, we are getting close to completing that particular mission.

The yellow, demand reduction. People don't think of the Department of Defense and demand reduction, but, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the zero tolerance policies that I described at the beginning of my remarks, I would also tell you that we are actively engaged in such demand reduction efforts as implementing the Drug Abuse Resistance Education [DARE] Program in Department of Defense schools.

When I visited Mark Twain Elementary School in Heidelberg, Germany last year, I went into the elementary school and saw young military policemen come in and teach, just as the teachers do, about staying off drugs. It was perceived to be a very successful program because our young soldiers are of such high quality, they are great role models for our young people.

So, we have the DARE Program. We have other kinds of programs that we are focusing on to implement our demand-reduction goals.

But it is important to remember that the Department of Defense, while we are implementing our statutory missions and the President's strategy, and the Secretary's policies aggressively, and I think with high energy, we are a supporting agency. This is a new role for the Department of Defense. We are normally engaged in the business of defining missions and setting about to perform those missions, and leading the charge.

And here we are in a support role. We are to help the law enforcement agencies accomplish their mission, using our unique skills and our resources, and our unique experience.

We think we have aggressively attacked this new mission in the last 2 years. Certainly, it remains a high priority national security mission within the Department of Defense. The Secretary reaffirms that on a regular basis. And I guess we are always willing to reassess policies and where we go from here, but we feel ourselves like we have made very good progress in the last 2 years.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will close and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Duncan follows:]

**STATEMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT
POLICY AND SUPPORT**

HONORABLE STEPHEN M. DUNCAN

**HEARING BEFORE THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL**

JUNE 20, 1991

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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND
CONTROL**

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS STEPHEN M. DUNCAN

Stephen M. Duncan was nominated by President Reagan to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs on August 7, 1987, and was confirmed by the United States Senate on October 23, 1987. He was reappointed to that office by President Bush on June 20, 1989.

As Assistant Secretary, Mr. Duncan serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all matters involving the 1.68 million members of the Reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces, including the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve. He also serves separately as the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support. In that capacity, he acts as the principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary for all policies and programs of the Department of Defense in support of the President's crusade against illegal drugs. For his service as Assistant Secretary, he has received the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.



Mr. Duncan was born in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on March 28, 1941. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1963, receiving his Bachelor of Science Degree and a commission as Ensign, U.S. Navy.

He served as a deck and watch officer aboard U.S.S. ESTES (AGC-12), an amphibious flagship which directed amphibious landings near Chu Lai, Vietnam in the Spring of 1965. He subsequently served as the Weapons Officer aboard U.S.S. CARRONADE (RFS-1), the flagship of a division of four rocket ships which provided close-in gunfire support to ground forces in Vietnam. His combat decorations include the Navy Commendation Medal (with Combat "V"), the Combat Action Ribbon, the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry (Bronze Star), the Navy Unit Commendation and various other unit citations and campaign medals related to his service in Vietnam.

In 1967, Mr. Duncan was appointed Assistant Professor of Naval Science at Dartmouth College, where he taught Naval Engineering and Naval History. He received his Master of Arts Degree in American Government from Dartmouth College in 1969.

Mr. Duncan transferred to the U.S. Naval Reserve in 1969. At the time of his first appointment in 1987, he held the rank of Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve. He is a recipient of the Armed Forces Reserve Medal.

Assistant Secretary Duncan attended the University of Colorado School of Law and received his Doctor of Jurisprudence Degree in 1971. He served as Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1972-73. From 1973 to 1987 he was engaged in the private practice of law in Denver, Colorado, most recently as a partner in the Denver firm of Hopper, Kanouff, Smith, Peryam, Terry, and Duncan. His practice was concentrated in the trial and appeal of complex commercial disputes in both federal and state courts.

Mr. Duncan is a member of the Bar of the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Colorado, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals and other federal courts. He is a member of the faculty of the Trial Advocacy Institute at the University of Virginia School of Law and in 1982 he was elected a Fellow of the International Society of Barristers. He has published articles in various professional journals. He has served as an elected member of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association and the Board of Trustees of the Denver Bar Association.

Assistant Secretary Duncan is married to the former Luella Rinehart of Santa Monica, California. They have two daughters. Kelly is a 1990 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and is serving on active duty with the Navy. Paige is a college student.

June 1991

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the policies which have been established and the actions that have been taken by the Department of Defense to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy and to comply with the counterdrug responsibilities assigned to the Department by the 1989 Defense Authorization Act.

Because the DoD counterdrug activities are broad and complex in nature, and because this is my first opportunity to discuss our counterdrug programs with this Committee, I have taken the liberty of submitting a comprehensive written statement. I have made a special effort to address the specific issues which you raised in your recent letters to Secretary Cheney.

Assumption of Major
Counterdrug Responsibilities

In January 1988, the drug interdiction activities of the Armed Forces constituted some 18 percent of the total federal drug enforcement program, and it was estimated at the time that expenditures by the Department of Defense on interdiction had risen from \$1 million in FY 1981, to \$196 million in 1986. Most of the military interdiction effort to that time had taken the form of surveillance services, particularly the use of airborne radar (such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft).

A new era in the use of the Armed Forces to fight illegal drugs was initiated by the FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act.

Title XI of the Act and the related Appropriations Act gave the Department \$300 million to carry out significant new responsibilities. First, the Department was directed to serve as the "single lead agency of the federal government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States." Second, the legislation required that the Secretary of Defense integrate into an "effective communications network" the command, control, communications and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs. Finally, the Act provided for an enhanced role for the National Guard, under the direction of state governors, to support state drug interdiction and law enforcement operations.

The President's approach to the use of the Armed Forces in anti-drug activities was set in his first State of the Union Address to a joint session of Congress. Referring to the resources that would be required to combat the scourge of illegal drugs, the President noted that much of the resources "will be used to protect our borders, with help from the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Department of State and Justice, and yes, the U. S. Military."

On March 21, 1989, Secretary Cheney assumed office. On April 22, 1989, he took the first step to focus the various counterdrug activities of the Department by designating me as the Department's "Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support."



On September 5, 1989, the President issued the first phase of the National Drug Control Strategy. On September 18, 1989, Secretary Cheney issued broad, new policy guidance to the Department, which was designed to assist in the swift and effective implementation of the President's Strategy within the Department. Stating that international trafficking in drugs is a "national security" problem for the United States, that the Department has a "crucial role" in defending the United States from the scourge of illegal drugs, and that the Department would employ the resources at its command to accomplish that mission effectively, he designated the detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs as a "high priority national security mission of the Department of Defense." He simultaneously informed all of the CINCs of the Unified and Specified Commands of the elevated priority of the Department's counterdrug missions and directed certain of those commanders to prepare specific plans for the implementation of the counterdrug missions within their respective areas of responsibility.

Twenty one months have passed since Secretary Cheney elevated the priority of the counternarcotics mission within the Department. Much has happened in that time. On November 13, 1989, the Commander-in-Chief of Forces Command (CINCFOR) was designated as a counterdrug supported CINC. On the same day, Joint Task Force Six was established at Fort Bliss, El Paso, Texas, to serve as a planning and coordinating headquarters for the provision of DoD counternarcotics support to federal, state

and local law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border. On December 20, 1989, Operation JUST CAUSE began in Panama.

On March 1, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed me to submit a plan and program for DoD counternarcotics activities, establishing objectives and defining a strategy for achieving those objectives. On April 27, 1990, I submitted to the Secretary of Defense the first Drug interdiction and counterdrug activities Program Objective Memorandum (POM). On August 2, 1990, Operation DESERT SHIELD commenced. On August 15, 1990, the Department commenced a 90 day period of "enhanced" detection and monitoring activities in the Caribbean. On January 16, 1991, Operation DESERT STORM commenced. On February 27, 1991, combat operations against Iraq were suspended. On February 28, 1991, the temporary cease fire took effect.

Attacking Illegal Drugs at the Source

In his policy guidance to the Department on September 18, 1989, the Secretary of Defense directed that the flow of drugs be attacked at every phase -- at the source, in transit, and in the United States. The policy of attacking illegal drugs at their source was designed to assist in the implementation of a major part of the President's National Drug Control Strategy, which is a concentrated effort to control and defeat the drug trade in the principal cocaine source countries -- Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. The broad objective is to work with the governments of each of those nations to disrupt and destroy the growing, processing, and

transportation of coca and coca products within each country.

The President's strategy seeks to attain four near-term goals: to strengthen the political will and institutional capability of the three nations to enable them to disrupt and dismantle the trafficking organizations; to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement and military activities of the nations against the cocaine trade; to inflict significant damage on the trafficking organizations by disrupting trafficking operations; and to strengthen and diversify the legitimate economies of the Andean Nations to enable them to overcome the destabilizing effects of eliminating cocaine, a major source of income.

Department of Defense personnel have continued to provide training and operational support to host-nation counternarcotics forces throughout the Andean region. Total military aid has grown substantially in recent years. In 1988, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru received approximately \$3 million; in 1990 the total was \$114.5 million. DoD operational assistance in the region has been provided in the form of Mobile Training Teams, Deployments for Training, and Short Duration Exercises. U. S. military personnel continue to train host nation police and military units for a variety of counternarcotics missions. Training is being provided in aircraft maintenance, logistics, individual and small unit tactics, leadership, and air mobile and riverine operations. Advice on the procurement and architecture of command, control, communications and intelligence facilities has been given.

Operational support in the form of planning assistance, medical, engineering, and civic action support are also being provided, along with air mobility assets which enhance the capability of the source countries to insert their own counternarcotics forces to remote regions where cocaine is grown, processed or transported.

As you know, on August 25, 1989, the President invoked the provisions of Section 506(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and authorized the draw down of up to \$65 million of DoD stocks for Colombia. The equipment which was provided at the end of FY 1989 and during FY 1990 included aircraft, boats, trucks, spare parts, ammunition, medical supplies, communications gear, and other equipment and training. Each item of material had been specifically requested by the Colombian Ministry of Defense and was made available from "off-the-shelf" DoD stocks.

In October, 1990, I visited Colombia to see first-hand how effective the skills of U.S. military personnel and DoD resources are to local counternarcotics operations. I can assure you that our support is effective. On February 27, 1991, I joined Secretary Cheney and other DoD officials in a meeting with President Cesar Gaviria and members of his government here in Washington, in which the Secretary reaffirmed the Department's support of Colombia's counternarcotics efforts and assured that nation that our training and equipment assistance will continue.

In Bolivia, the general objective has been to develop an autonomous Bolivian institutional capability to regulate and

eliminate illicit drugs, and to apprehend and imprison or extradite major drug traffickers. The primary counternarcotics missions to Bolivia have included operational planning and tactical operations training for both the Bolivian armed forces and the counterdrug police. This includes training in riverine operations, radar assessments and surveys, logistics and maintenance. In the past, DoD personnel have trained only the Bolivian Navy, Air Force and the UMOPAR (Bolivian rural mobile police) since the Bolivian Army has been prohibited from engaging in counter-drug activities. On April 4, 1991, however, the Bolivian Congress approved entry into Bolivia of U.S. Army personnel for the training of two Bolivian Army battalions in counter-drug operations. The Government of Bolivia has approved the Bolivian Army to act in a limited support role to the UMOPAR's counter-drug activities.

The general strategy is the same in Peru as in Colombia and Bolivia. The primary DoD counternarcotics missions for Peru include the training of Peru's counternarcotics forces for tactical operations, military planning support for the "Snowcap" operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration, radar surveys and assessments, logistical/maintenance training, and security and feasibility assessments of operational bases.

DoD efforts to reduce the trafficking of drugs from Latin American source countries have been led by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Major actions during FY 90 included completion of the delivery of the \$65 million in equipment and

services to Colombia authorized by 506(a) drawdown authority in FY 89 as well as development of counternarcotics strategies and plans for Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, which laid the foundation for the provision of \$112 million in Foreign Military Financing in FY 90.

DoD assistance and training have played a key role in a number of successful operations in the Andean region. A significant contribution was made by the Department, for example, in a large scale classified operation which took place within the last few months. U.S. military personnel provided intelligence and communications logistics support, helped prepare target packages and otherwise participated in the planning of the operation. All of the U.S. law enforcement personnel who participated had received extensive training from the DoD at a variety of locations throughout the U.S. Host nation forces were also recipients of extensive DoD training which related to virtually every aspect of the operation. A substantial inventory of equipment provided by the Department was used, including weapons and communications equipment. The results of the operation were impressive. A drug "kingpin" and some 131 others were arrested. Numerous commercial and residential properties were seized along with 22 aircraft, over \$300,000 in U.S. currency and over 1,000 kilograms of processed and unprocessed coca products. Seven laboratories and 41 clandestine airstrips were destroyed and a major trafficking ring was totally disrupted.

Attacking Illegal Drugs in Transit

The Detection and Monitoring Mission. The ultimate goal of the interdiction of illegal drugs is to deter drug smuggling by intercepting and disrupting the traffickers' operations and seizing illicit shipments entering the U.S. This raises the cost of doing business by forcing them to adopt expensive countermeasures, use longer and more circuitous routes, train replacements for apprehended personnel, acquire expensive and sophisticated electronic countermeasures and communications systems, develop new concealment techniques, and replace seized aircraft, vessels and vehicles.

There is no doubt that recent interdiction efforts have succeeded in preventing significant amounts of illegal drugs from reaching users in the United States. In FY 90, the Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and the Border Patrol (with the support of the National Guard and other military forces) made over 16,000 drug related arrests and seized a combined 215,000 pounds of cocaine with a street value estimated to be in excess of \$3 billion.

The Department's detection and monitoring capabilities have continued to improve through the use of substantial detection and monitoring assets which are employed pursuant to a "Defense in Depth" concept. The concept involves the forward basing of certain sensor assets (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Radar Network).

and layered subsequent lines of sensors. The three military commands which are the focal point of the detection and monitoring mission (Atlantic, Pacific, and North American Aerospace Defense Commands) continue to improve their ability to gather and process multi-source tactical intelligence information. They also are making use of data available from land-based aerostats and radars, and they are increasingly successful in coordinating or directing the use of mobile, tactical surveillance assets, such as ships, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, and ship-based aerostats. Other recent improvements include the integration into the counter-narcotics mission of Regional Operation Centers at Joint Task Force Four (CARIBROC) and at SOUTHCOM (SOUTHROC). These centers help ensure that DoD assets are deployed to areas where the trafficking threat is the greatest.

The most important use of these capabilities and assets involves the sharing of usable and timely interdiction information with other drug law enforcement agencies. We have placed great significance on our continuing efforts to improve the coordination of our detection and monitoring activities with other agencies. Our success in doing so was recently commended by the House Armed Services Committee in its May, 1991 Report on the FY 1992 Defense Authorization Bill.

Representatives of law enforcement agencies say DoD support is better now than it has ever been, and there is real synchronization of efforts among all participating agencies. The committee applauds this improvement and encourages its continuance.

The Department has significantly increased the level of its aerial and maritime detection and monitoring activities over the last several months, by increasing the number of ships and AEW aircraft involved. For the reasons which are discussed later in this Statement, I am reluctant to place too much weight on objective data because of their potential to be misleading, but it is a fact that the tempo of detection and monitoring activities in FY 1990 was substantially greater than the tempo in FY 1989 (48,025/18,436 flying hours, 3,830/2,081 steaming days). The training value for the Active and Reserve forces that participate in interdiction and other counternarcotics activities varies according to the nature of the activities, and is difficult to gauge, but it is often considerable. The activities have had a very positive effect on the morale of many of the military units and individuals that I have talked to, and without exception, the CINCs and Joint Task Force commanders continue to praise the training realism of most of the activities.

The USCINCLANT has expanded that command's surface presence in the Caribbean through the formation of Task Group (TG) 4.1, which reports to Joint Task Force Four. A flag officer has been designated as the Commander of TG 4.1 and the presence at sea of the flag officer has raised the intensity level of the detection and monitoring operations in that area significantly. For fully coordinated regional operations, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) has provided ships to USCINCLANT to operate off the west coast of Central America in USCINCLANT's westernmost area of

responsibility, forming Task Unit 4.1.2. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments have embarked aboard all of USCINCLANT's vessels which are dedicated to counternarcotics. This has enabled situational transitions from detection and monitoring to apprehension and interdiction. Navy and Coast Guard forces have been jointly operating in the Caribbean since 1981 and the current patrols constitute the largest joint Navy-Coast Guard operations since the Vietnam Conflict.

Because of the size of USCINCPAC's area of responsibility, the Pacific Command continues to face a formidable challenge. USCINCPAC must respond not only to cocaine trafficking from South America, but also to narcotics produced in Southeast Asia and the Hawaiian marijuana crop. To counter illicit trafficking, USCINCPAC performs air and maritime detection and monitoring in the trade routes into the west coast of the U.S. and in the vicinity of Hawaii. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments deploy to surface ships to carry out boardings of suspect vessels. In support of law enforcement agencies in Hawaii, Southeast Asia, and the western United States, USCINCPAC provides manpower and equipment on a daily basis to assist in routine operations and special exercises. Joint Task Force Five continues to coordinate detection and monitoring activities in the Pacific area.

The counterdrug missions of the Commander-in-Chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) continue, but the methods used to carry out detection and monitoring

activities have improved. The most significant difference has been the number of tracks requiring positive identification. Prior to September 1989, any aircraft (with few exceptions) approaching North America at less than 180 knots ground speed was assumed friendly and positive identification was not attempted. All such tracks now require positive identification. CINCNORAD has also developed new means of employing tactical radars (E-3s, mobile ground radars, and fighters) and moved from short (two-week) to long (90-day) operations.

The NORAD Tactical Intelligence Cell (NORTIC) became operational in February 1990 in a newly constructed secure facility at Cheyenne Mountain AFB, Colorado. NORTIC has designated a peacetime aerial reconnaissance area along the southwest border area, processed southwest border area imagery requests for LEAs, and developed NORAD Essential Elements of Information for counternarcotics, including those applicable to captured aircraft.

The interdiction efforts of CINCFOR are focused on support to operations of law enforcement agencies within the U.S. JTF-6 serves as a planning and coordinating headquarters for FORSCOM in providing counter-narcotics support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies along the Southwest border, while other subordinate FORSCOM commands focus on support in other areas.

In recent months, JTF-6 has provided substantial support to law enforcement agencies along the Southwest land border, primarily through Operation Alliance (which brings together

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to provide coordinated interdiction efforts). During FY 90, nearly 400,000 pounds of marijuana and 34,000 pounds of cocaine were seized as a result of initiatives coordinated by Operation Alliance. The DoD cannot, of course, take credit for all of these initiatives, but when I visited JTF-6 in November, 1990 with Deputy Secretary Atwood, we were informed by Drug Enforcement Administration personnel that there had been "tremendous growth in the DoD contributions" to the DEA in the last year and that "DoD is doing law enforcement a world of good."

During 1990 and early 1991, several operations in support of law enforcement agencies have been conducted along the Southwest border. The types of support provided have included small unit, long-range reconnaissance patrols in hard to cover areas, intelligence support to law enforcement agencies, and the clearing of brush to improve observation along potential trafficking routes. FORSCOM has also assisted in the improvement of roads along the border to provide ease of movement for law enforcement personnel and it has trained those personnel in various military skills to enhance their survivability along the border. Other activities have included the examination of the hulls of vessels for modifications below the water line which might be used for smuggling narcotics, and the air transportation of law enforcement personnel in interdiction and eradication operations. The type of support provided to the Border Patrol has consisted of remote sensors, listening/observation posts,

cross training, and engineer construction operations conducted within the southwest border drug interdiction area. Remote sensor and listening post/observation post operations involved manning observation posts to observe and report drug smuggling activity across the border.

One of the more noteworthy efforts along the southwest border led to the detection in May 1990 of a tunnel used to transport large shipments of cocaine between the U.S. and Mexico. Using seismic equipment, DoD personnel from Fort Belvoir, Virginia assisted in locating the highly sophisticated tunnel which was a major artery for transport of drugs from South and Central America into the United States. Federal agents intercepted a shipment of more than a ton of cocaine.

Current Trends in Trafficking. All cocaine consumed in the United States, over 90 percent of the imported marijuana, and some 30 percent of all heroin used in this country come from Latin America and the Caribbean. Some of the region's countries have had limited success in implementing eradication programs. Regional interdiction efforts have generally improved over the last two years, but the flow of illicit drugs from this region continues to be formidable.

In response to escalating worldwide cocaine use and intensified counterdrug operations, narcotraffickers have established complex and diversified trafficking patterns. For instance, they have come to rely increasingly on smuggling routes

which stretch across South American "spillover" countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Cocaine transiting these countries frequently is destined for the burgeoning European market, where prices are currently double and triple those in the United States.

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean also play a significant role in the Latin American narcotics industry. Mexico remains the favored route for cocaine destined for the United States from South America. In 1990, an estimated 60 percent of all cocaine entering the United States passed through Mexico. In addition, Central America is frequently used as a transshipment route, most notably the countries of Guatemala and Belize. The Caribbean region has been, and continues to be, heavily used by traffickers to ship cocaine by air and sea.

Beginning in September 1990, we began to detect frequent multiple aircraft convoys departing Colombia and landing at clandestine airfields in Mexico. It was apparent that limitations of source and transit country forces made interdiction of these shipments difficult. Some initial hurdles have been overcome through operational and diplomatic efforts.

The Mexican Government is responding to the increased threat of air delivered shipments of cocaine from South America by developing an enhanced interdiction capability, including the creation of a Northern Border Response Force, construction of a series of ground based radars along its southern border, and the purchase of specially outfitted tracker aircraft that can work in

concert with U.S. radar assets operation in international airspace. We have furnished nine transport helicopters for the new Response Force in FY 1991. We are also providing tactical information on suspected air traffickers and suspect ships.

Those countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America that are used for transit and diversion of precursor chemicals cover a vast geographic area and provide only limited opportunity for actual interdiction. As pressure has built against illegal drug trafficking throughout the Bahamas and parts of the Caribbean, the traffickers have already begun to develop new smuggling routes into the U.S. Our enforcement resources are flexibly deployed in a cost-effective manner to meet continuously changing traffic patterns.

Two Central American countries present special circumstances. The combination of geography and persistent efforts by some to undermine its democratically elected government, make Panama a major transshipment country for cocaine. Guatemala is also growing in importance. The Office of National Drug Control Policy has indicated that these two countries will receive priority consideration within the U.S. drug suppression assistance budget levels for transit countries.

Operation Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos Islands (OPBAT) continues to be highly successful against drug smuggling flights into The Bahamas - so successful, in fact, that there has been a shift in such drug flights over the past year.

Various reports indicate that large amounts of drugs enter

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the United States through Puerto Rico, an attractive transshipment point for smugglers since goods arriving to the United States from the island are not subject to inspection by U.S. Customs. The most common delivery technique used to ship drugs through Puerto Rico is to airdrop the drugs over water for pickup by surface vessels. Various means are then used to transport the drugs out of Puerto Rico to the U.S.

The eastern Caribbean-Bahamas area continues to be a high intensity trafficking region. The primary mode of transportation is light privately owned aircraft which are used to drop the drugs to waiting boats. The drugs are then moved to the Florida mainland, where a variety of conveyances are used to take the drugs to their final destination in the U.S. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have experienced less activity in very recent few months.

Over the past several years, the South American narcotics industry has begun to shift cocaine production to Bolivia and to diversify transshipment routes, dispatching an increasing volume through Argentina and other spillover countries to Europe and the United States. Generally, narcotics related activities in Argentina have been increasing in recent years. Cocaine base and hydrochloride (HCl) seizures have risen from an estimated .6 metric tons (mt) in 1987 to .9 mt in 1990. The Drug Enforcement Administration has estimated that hundreds of kilograms of processed cocaine transit Argentina to Europe and the U.S. each month. For example, Argentina is an important transit country

for cocaine seized in Germany. An estimated 10 mt of cocaine HCl were produced in Argentina in 1990. (In perspective, current estimates are that up to 1100 mt of HCl could have been produced from the estimated 1990 total South American coca leaf harvest.)

Recent trends in Argentina must be placed in the context of a larger South American spillover phenomenon. In addition to producing an estimated 72 mt of HCl in Bolivia in 1990, narcotraffickers dispersed their operations to neighboring countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay. Brazil's vast and porous borders have rendered it particularly vulnerable to this trend. A large volume of cocaine reportedly is transiting western Brazilian states such as Rondonia. Traditionally, Brazil and Paraguay have been transshipment corridors for a variety of contraband entering and leaving Bolivia. Colombia's two-year-old counternarcotics offensive has accelerated the diffusion of the cocaine trade. However, while dispersion of the industry has been gathering momentum, Colombia remains the focal point of both cocaine conversion and transshipment activities worldwide.

The Impact of the Persian Gulf War on DoD Counterdrug Activities. Contrary to the speculation of some commentators, the intensity of the fight by the Department of Defense against illegal drugs did not slacken as a result of the war in the Persian Gulf. The Counterdrug Program of the Department, including detection and monitoring activities, has, in fact, been

implemented with great vigor during the last fifteen months. The prosecution of our counterdrug efforts has taken place even while the Department has been engaged in significant armed conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf and while we have begun the task of restructuring and reducing the Armed Forces to adapt to the changes in the strategic environment and a seriously constrained budget.

Although Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM have had an impact from time to time on some of the resources that have been available for the performance of certain counterdrug missions, the long-term upward trend in the number and scope of DoD counterdrug activities has continued unabated. The detection and countering of the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs has remained, and continues to be a high priority national security mission of the Department of the Defense.

The drawdown that did occur during Operation DESERT STORM primarily involved Airborne Early Warning (AEW) assets. The number of U.S. Navy ships has also been reduced, but to a lesser extent. But, there has been no reduction in the intensity of DoD's counterdrug activities. For example, prior to DESERT SHIELD, DoD had planned a concentrated effort to conduct surveillance of the eastern Pacific and Caribbean. This effort was completed during DESERT SHIELD in its entirety, and because of its initial success has been continued.

The tempo of counterdrug operations has remained close to the same levels that existed prior to DESERT SHIELD. Our level

of support to law enforcement counterdrug missions has significantly increased. Joint Task Force 6 has already supported more missions to date this year than in all of FY 1990. Overall, the number of missions supported by the Armed Forces so far this year is five times greater than it was all of last year. Much of our success in continuing or increasing our support to law enforcement agencies during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM has been the result of our increasingly effective reliance on National Guard and federal Reserve forces when Active duty forces are otherwise engaged.

Attacking Illegal Drugs in the United States

Enhanced Use of the National Guard. Acting in Title 32 or "state" status and in accordance with plans submitted by the governors of all 54 states and territories, the National Guard performed over 5,000 counternarcotics missions in FY 90 and devoted over 530,000 mandays to those missions. This was almost three times the total of the year before. Every day spent by Guard personnel on counternarcotics duty has been entirely voluntary.

Fiscal Year 90 was the second year in which the Department reviewed plans proposed by the states and territories. Each was scrutinized to ensure that it was operationally feasible, consistent with the law and DoD policies, and that the costing methodology employed by the state that proposed it was valid. In

order to ensure fairness and an allocation of funding for the plans which is related to our counternarcotics objectives. I established a prioritized set of weighted criteria and standards against which each plan was measured.

National Guard personnel have been assigned counternarcotics duties that conform as nearly as possible to individual military occupational specialties. The duties have included special training programs for law enforcement officers and National Guard personnel, aerial and ground transportation of law enforcement officers and contraband, and numerous radar and imagery missions unique to National Guard capabilities. Other support missions have included inspection of commercial cargo at land border entry points, seaports and international airports. During major operations over several months, National Guard personnel have manned surveillance posts along the southwest border, provided ground and aerial surveillance of remote, clandestine airstrips, and provided important communications support. Various types of equipment have been used in the operations, including tactical ground transport and cargo vehicles, communications equipment, tactical radar, night vision devices, Army National Guard rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft as well as Air National Guard fixed wing aircraft.

With assistance from the National Guard, the Customs Service was able to inspect 14% of all containers arriving from source or transit countries in FY 1990, up from 4% prior to the introduction of National Guard support. The containers inspected

from all countries included 2,936,923 full and 507,212 empty. Customs Service seizures for FY 90 were supported by approximately nine hundred and eighty-one Guard personnel from twenty-one states. The Customs Service has informed me that this support by the National Guard has been "invaluable."

National Guard personnel also helped eradicate over 6.7 million marijuana plants in FY 90. Counterdrug operations by the Kentucky National Guard, a state with one of the most aggressive eradication programs, resulted in the eradication of 550,000 marijuana plants and the arrest of 250 people. Kentucky Guard personnel spent over 22,000 manhours in this effort.

Use of Active Forces. Shortly after the beginning of FY 90, PACOM and FORSCOM were granted authority to use active duty military forces in the Continental United States and Hawaii to provide operational support to law enforcement agencies for marijuana eradication efforts on public lands and for other activities. Participation by Active personnel in FY 90 included such activities as:

- Eradication of marijuana, assistance to law enforcement agency personnel in the removal and/or destruction of contraband and conducting transportation operations
- Administrative and logistical support
- Air and ground transportation
- Reconnaissance of marijuana gardens
- Navigational assistance to law enforcement agency

personnel in rough terrain

Operation WIPEOUT was conducted in the State of Hawaii, primarily on the big island of Hawaii, from July 17 to October 12, 1990. The operation involved military support of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources in a marijuana eradication effort for which CINCPAC coordinated all-service support. By October 10, 1990, 351,924 marijuana plants had been eradicated at an estimated street value over \$520 million¹. An estimated 95 percent of the marijuana crop in the Hawaiian Islands was destroyed in the operation. Operation GHOST DANCER was conducted from July 23 to October 5, 1990. That operation involved support coordinated by CINCPAC for Bureau of Land Management (BLM) marijuana eradication efforts in western Oregon. Some 7,184 marijuana plants, with an estimated street value of \$20.6 million were eradicated in the operation. Sixteen people were arrested; five vehicles, six weapons, and four methamphetamine labs were seized. Operation GREEN SWEEP, conducted from July 20 until August 6, 1990, involved CINCPAC coordinated support for BLM marijuana eradication in California. The BLM requested military assistance in support of a marijuana eradication operation in the Kings Range Conservation Area located in Humboldt and Mendocino counties in Northern California. The total amount of marijuana

¹ The value of a marijuana plant is based on several factors, including plant variety, size, and THC concentration. Cultivated US cannabis is typically valued at about \$1,000/plant, while sinsemilla, a hybrid with a much greater THC concentration, can be worth over \$3,000/plant.

eradicated was 1,282 plants at an estimated street value of \$3.85 million.

Demand Reduction. While great attention has been given to the efforts of the Department of Defense to implement the President's National Drug Control Strategy through a wide range of support to law enforcement agencies, much less is known about the efforts of the individual Military Departments to institute drug abuse prevention and education programs for service members, their dependents, and for DoD civilians.

Demand reduction efforts in the Department have been focused in the areas of urinalysis, education, community service, and treatment/rehabilitation. As in the past, the Department's demand reduction programs in FY 90 were extremely successful. The DoD schools expanded Project D.A.R.E. (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) to include over 80% of the overseas schools in school year 1990-91, all schools will be covered next year. This program will be expanded from grades 5-6 to also include higher level grades in the next school year.

To recognize outstanding demand reduction programs within the Military Departments, I have established an annual Secretary of Defense award. The first presentation of the new award will be made in the Summer of 1991. The award has been designed to encourage the Military Departments to heighten drug abuse awareness in communities across the nation through specially targeted demand reduction programs.

The Military Departments have also continued to successfully implement our aggressive urinalysis policy by testing over three million specimens. I remain convinced that this program is the most effective means of eliminating drug abuse in the Armed Forces. The urinalysis testing program continues to reflect downward trends in the use of illegal substances by uniformed military personnel. Data from prior worldwide surveys reflected a dramatic 82 percent reduction in reported drug use during the time period 1980-1988. The 1991 Worldwide Survey of Alcohol and Drug Use Among Military Personnel is currently being developed.

Drug testing of civilian employees of the Department of Defense was authorized in April 1985. All DoD components have now begun drug education and testing programs for personnel in specially designated positions. Applicants for such positions are all subject to testing prior to employment. The job functions associated with these positions have an immediate impact on public health and safety, the protection of life and property, law enforcement or U.S. national security. Less than one percent of those tested to date have tested positive.

The Department continues its commitment to a program of drug treatment for junior enlisted personnel. The nonresidential and residential rehabilitation treatment programs of the Military Services continue to be available to eligible Service personnel who have substance abuse problems and on a limited basis to family members who have such problems. During FY 89, worldwide,

some 5,834 personnel were referred for nonresidential treatment; 2,223 were returned to duty. Of the 585 personnel referred for residential treatment, 510 were returned to duty. Data is not yet available for FY 90.

The "zero tolerance" policy for drug abuse remains strong in each of the Military Services. Generally, the Services have acted with dispatch in discharging personnel testing positive for substance abuse. An analysis of retention data reveals that the Services are becoming less inclined to retain these personnel.

**The Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence Mission**

The FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act also required the Secretary of Defense to integrate into an "effective communications network, the "command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs." I have noted on several previous occasions that the key to the integration of the communications networks of the various law enforcement agencies is secure systems interoperability and commonality which will permit cost effective communications between the regional DoD detection and monitoring activities, the C3I centers, and the law enforcement agencies. The Drug Enforcement Telecommunications Implementation Plan (DETIP) which was published by DoD in September, 1989, provides the structure for coordinating the implementation of a standards-driven, interoperable, secure and protected communications capability among the numerous agencies

and operational facilities which are involved in drug enforcement activities.

The Secretary of Defense has designated the Defense Communications Agency to be the single agency within the Department responsible for the implementation of the DETIP. The DETIP, which was developed in early 1988, implements the goals of the National Telecommunications Master Plan for Drug Enforcement, which was first published in mid-1989. The Master Plan established a comprehensive strategy and architecture for an effective communications network to support the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States. It contains the standards and mutually agreed upon procedures that furnish a common baseline from which the participating agencies can develop their programs of implementation.

During the past year, the Defense Communications Agency has made great progress in its efforts to enhance interagency telecommunications capabilities and to improve the protection of sensitive and classified information. More than \$82 million in FY 89 and 90 procurement funds have been obligated to support the secure or protected voice and data transfer requirements of the Federal law enforcement agencies. An additional \$56 million has been budgeted for FY91 to support this same effort. Some State and local law enforcement agencies will be provided with secure telephones and secure mobile radio equipment.

With respect to satellite communications, I would note that a network is currently in final acceptance testing which will

have the capability to provide a secure voice capability between the Caribbean Basin radar facilities, and command centers in Florida. Automated high frequency radio systems are also being procured. These radios are more reliable, make better use of the frequency spectrum, are easier to operate, and are less vulnerable to interception.

Success in integrating communications networks for counternarcotics activities will require interoperability and compatibility at all levels among the agencies involved. To this end, the Joint Staff established a division in the Command, Control and Communications Directorate (J-6) to handle all issues related to the counternarcotics mission. This new division has supported the CINCs and LEAs in all aspects of command, control and communications (C3) counternarcotics support and has been instrumental in identifying and resolving many issues and improving interoperability.

The Department is continuing to oversee the development and installation of the Caribbean Basin Radar Network. We are also closely following a potential SOUTHCOM requirement to expand the program to additional Andean Ridge nations. The Joint Staff has validated the requirement for the SOUTHCOM communications and intelligence Counternarcotics Command Management System, and ensured that a prototype test will be performed. Additionally, the requirement to handle the increased sensor input from the detection and monitoring function is being further defined.

Satellite support has been provided continuously to the

Coast Guard for improved Caribbean operations. Communications equipment was provided to the DEA to improve its Snowcap operations in the Andean Ridge. The Department recently equipped the Customs Service P-3 Airborne Early Warning aircraft with satellite communications. Programs are also underway to fuse multisource intelligence data in the Antidrug Network (discussed below) so that all subscribers (DOD and the law enforcement agencies) will have access to much needed intelligence information. Other critical C3 issues are also being addressed, such as standards, imagery transfer, intelligence fusion, the lack of standard classification guides, and Satellite Communications requirements and capabilities.

The architecture for providing secure and interoperable communications systems for counternarcotics applications is a part of the Defense Data Network and is known as the "Anti-Drug Network", or "ADNET". This system provides high resolution vector maps, functional overlays, and tactical contacts on a high speed, high resolution workstation. The Anti-Drug Network allows free text generation to be transferred in a secure environment and relies on the STU-III secure telephone link for secure communications backup.

During FY 90, the Department provided law enforcement agencies with significant assistance in integrating their operations into the Anti-Drug Network. The agencies currently participating in the Anti-Drug Network include the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, and the Coast

Guard. The Anti-Drug Network provides to all its sites -- DoD or law enforcement agency -- a backbone communications capability over which they can pass time sensitive counternarcotics detection and monitoring information. Even where a particular agency purchases the hardware for the Antidrug Network workstation, the DoD provides installation support, training, configuration management, security engineering, and across the board trouble-shooting assistance for all implementation levels.

Success in any effort to interdict the supply of illegal drugs depends to a great extent, of course, upon the availability of good intelligence. I stated in testimony to the Congress last year that coordination of the exchange of intelligence between law enforcement agencies and the Armed Forces has involved what I have called "a clash of operating cultures." I am happy to report that as operating personnel have become more familiar with the capabilities and limitations of their law enforcement or military counterparts, coordination has continued to improve significantly.

Other Initiatives

In addition to the three missions which were given to the Department of Defense by Title XI of the FY 1989 National Defense Authorization Act (detection and monitoring, enhanced use of the National Guard, and the integration of C3I communications), and the initiatives of the CINCs, the Department has continued to initiate and implement other counternarcotics missions or

activities.

Loan of Military Personnel. Last year I informed the Congress of our plans to detail as many as 275 military personnel to federal drug law enforcement agencies and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. During the summer of 1990, the assignment action began. The detailees were assigned to the agencies on a non-reimbursable basis.

Much of the work of the detailees has been concentrated on enhancing the intelligence capabilities of drug law enforcement agencies. The detailees also assist generally in the exchange of information among federal, state, and local LEAs. Although the detailees work in a SUPPORT capacity, their efforts have permitted badly needed agents from the law enforcement agencies to return to field work, especially during the early implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

The positive effects of this DoD program have been quite evident. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters has advised me that a DoD detailee assigned to the State Department's Air Division has "done a tremendous job" in reshaping that program. DoD detailees at the Immigration and Naturalization Service have built critical data bases and mapping and reconnaissance folders for use by Border Patrol sectors. This has resulted in Border Patrol agents being able to return to field duty. In a special two year loan project, ten military attorneys have been detailed to the Office

of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to try drug-related felony cases in the Superior Court. They have presented hundreds of cases to the Grand Jury, and obtained indictments for drug-related crimes. The officers have managed an average of over 200 felony cases per officer.

Training of Law Enforcement Personnel. The Military Departments are continuing to provide significant training support to law enforcement agencies. The training of agency personnel falls into two general categories, formal DoD schools, and all other training. DoD Regional Logistical Support Offices are responsible for coordinating the use of the DoD formal schools' programs. The CINCs are responsible for all other training. There are many outstanding examples of training support. The Army provides helicopter training programs and tactical/survival training for Operation Snowcap personnel (a DEA source country initiative). Snowcap personnel regularly attend courses offered at the Ranger Training Brigade at Fort Benning, Georgia. The Navy conducts Mobile Training Team assignments in CONUS to give technical training to the Coast Guard. Last year two Navy Mobile Training Units expended 352 manhours to train personnel from nine Coast Guard cutters. Naval special warfare units provide law enforcement agents with training in riverine and small boat operations.

In FY 90, the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center included counternarcotics training in all Navy Basic

Officer and Enlisted Intelligence training courses and advanced Intelligence training and Marine Corps courses.

Military Correctional Facilities. More than 1300 confinement spaces at DoD facilities have been identified for review by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for possible temporary use as overflow facilities. A BOP survey has concluded that five military facilities meet that agency's requirements, including Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Hood, Texas and Naval facilities at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Newport, Rhode Island and Treasure Island, California. The BOP is currently reviewing its findings to determine the viability of these facilities prior to deciding, which, if any, will be utilized.

Training in Rehabilitation-Oriented Training Camp Establishment and Operation. The Department continues to provide training services to federal, state, and local agencies on the establishment and operation of rehabilitation-oriented training camps for first time drug offenders. Each agency's request is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and involves the training of each agency's own trainers, not the operation of the camps.

I noted in testimony last year that the Marine Corps conducted a successful three-week pilot program for the State of Maryland at Quantico, Virginia from January 29 to February 16, 1990. Five correctional officers participated in that training. Two one-week programs for the Los Angeles County Sheriff's

Department were conducted in June and September. The Marine Corps conducted a three-week course at Quantico, Virginia, in October for correctional officers from four other states and it completed another three-week course at Quantico, Virginia during March 1991. The Army has also initiated development of a Rehabilitation Training Instructor Course (RTIC) in response to requests from various civilian corrections agencies. The course has been designed to train correctional officers to use military skills in conducting rehabilitation-oriented training programs, and is expected to commence in the fourth quarter of FY91.

Canine Support. The best drug detection "technology" continues to be the cold wet nose of a drug-sniffing dog. The Department has made several military working dog teams available to support law enforcement agencies. In addition to conducting support for law enforcement DoD dog teams, the Department is also providing dog team training and assistance to LEAs in their efforts to procure working dogs. Given the recent increase in the number of requests, the assistance should continue to prove to be valuable support to the agencies. One request for support in FY 91, has involved the employment of 20 teams in one operation.

Regional Logistics Support Offices. Regional Logistics Support Offices (RLSOs) have now been established in Buffalo, New York; Miami, Florida; El Paso, Texas; and Long Beach, California

to provide non-operational support to LEAs. The RLSOs became fully manned and operational on August 1, 1990. The RLSOs work with all Services and are the primary point of contact for law enforcement agency requests for equipment loans, facilities, formal training, hazardous material disposal and military working dogs.

Law enforcement agencies submitted numerous equipment requests during FY 90. The equipment which was provided supports a wide spectrum of needs and included such items as ground sensors, small arms, uniforms, body armor, generators, forklifts, aircraft boarding ramps, diving equipment, turbine powered helicopters, night vision devices and secure hand held radios, and many other pieces of equipment.

Research and Development

To assist in the long-term utilization of DoD science and technology to aid the nation's effort to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs, I have been working with the DoD Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to map out a research and development strategy. We intend to establish a Technical Support Office within DDR&E to assist in the implementation of the strategy.

We have taken several steps in the development of a Contraband Detection Cargo Container Inspection Prototype Technology Development Plan. In the Conference Report accompanying the FY 1991 DoD Appropriations Act, the Department was requested to

prepare a comprehensive plan to develop prototype technology for contraband detection and cargo container inspection and to commit \$25 million of RDT&E funds, appropriated in the counter-drug central account, to the program. With the concurrence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I), I asked the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to assign the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as Executive Agent for this effort. DARPA has worked closely with representatives from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, U.S. Customs Service, DDR&E, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) and my staff, in developing the technological content and proposed funding schedule for the plan. Technologies which were assigned a high priority in the Conference Report are receiving special emphasis in the form of funding, multiple research and development approaches, and expedited contracting procedures.

Through the Science and Technology Committee of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Department has continued to support the National Drug Control Strategy in the areas of drug control research, automated data processing, and telecommunications interoperability. The Science and Technology Committee serves as the focal point for the technology requirements of federal drug law enforcement agencies and acts as the clearing-house for technological information. The membership of the Committee includes representatives from all major federal departments and agencies involved in the federal counternarcotics effort. The Department of Defense has assisted the law

enforcement members of the Committee in documenting requirements, determining existing capabilities, and identifying deficiencies in the agency's research and technology programs.

DoD research, development, testing and evaluation efforts continue in direct support of the objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy and include upgraded counternarcotics communications and automated data processing support for USSOUTHCOM, development of an automated counternarcotics intelligence system at NORAD, and Joint National Intelligence Data System upgrades. We are also developing an enhancement of several communications intercept, collection, and analysis systems for counternarcotics specific applications.

To assist in the near-term transfer of existing DoD technology to law enforcement agencies, the Department has hosted several technology forums where existing systems, equipment, and prototype hardware with application to the LEA community have been demonstrated. These forums have resulted in the identification of equipment and technology with direct applicability to law enforcement needs.

Measurements of Performance

Some representatives of the media and members of Congress are inclined to measure the performance of the counternarcotics programs of the Department of Defense by the same criteria that are often used to evaluate the performance of law enforcement agencies, e.g. the number of grand jury indictments which were

the direct result of DoD activities, the number of pounds of cocaine confiscated, the current price of coca leaf at an Andean market, etc. Abstract concepts like "deterrence" are often misunderstood and fail to satisfy a natural desire for immediate, tangible or "hard" results. The supporting role of the Armed Forces, limitations of law, the complexity of the national drug problem, and a strong institutional reluctance by the DoD to judge the Department's performance by artificial "body count" statistics, adds to the confusion. It is also fact that no single set of data can, in the words of the National Drug Control Strategy, "accurately reflect the full complexity of our current drug epidemic or the progress of our multi-faceted strategy to control the epidemic."

This is not to say that the activities of the Department of Defense should not be evaluated, merely that they should be measured against a realistic standard -- one that measures DoD performance against the specific and very important, but limited support missions and programs that have been assigned to it. While it may never be possible to determine with great precision whether any particular allocation of resources to fight the drug war is better than all other possible allocations, we recognize that Congress needs as much information as possible to determine which programs are the most effective. I have attacked this challenge in two ways.

First, I have insisted that the Department focus on realistic goals in the use of military forces. For example, we

should ask what the relevant data indicate about our success in detecting and monitoring potential aerial and maritime drug traffickers, rather than how many indictments resulted from our detection and monitoring activities. Second, I have initiated a comprehensive effort to obtain the judgment of those best suited to evaluate DoD support of law enforcement agencies--the agencies themselves. Lengthy questionnaires have recently been completed by senior law enforcement agency officials at my request, and candid, detailed assessments have been solicited and reviewed.

Measured against such standards, I am pleased to report that the Department has continued to make a major and very successful contribution to the implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy. I believe that the Department can fairly share in the Administration's successful attainment of the following National Strategy Objectives since 1989:

- a 29% reduction in occasional cocaine use
- a 23% reduction in frequent cocaine use
- an 11% reduction in current overall drug use
- a 13% reduction in current adolescent drug use

While DoD activities have been concentrated primarily on supply reduction programs, it is fair to assume that they have also had, in the words of the first National Drug Control Strategy, "an important, radiating effect on demand, as well, because they [made] the purchase of certain imported drugs more difficult -- and therefore less likely."

Progress has been made in a wide range of specific activities, some of which I have discussed earlier. For example, substantial equipment, training, intelligence and other support has been provided to the Andean nations. The interdiction and other counternarcotics capabilities of Mexico, Colombia and Bolivia have been enhanced by the delivery of U.S. military equipment and training and related services. Major improvements have been made in the performance of the detection and monitoring mission. Coordinated, multi-agency air interdiction efforts have achieved notable success. The cooperation and coordination between the Armed Forces and Federal law enforcement agencies continues to improve significantly. The increased success of the nation's interdiction efforts has forced drug traffickers to make significant operational adjustments in their trafficking routes. In his own recent testimony before the Congress, the new Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy noted that "success should be predicated on how effectively we are disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations," not solely on a "buy and bust" standard that focuses on a never-ending cycle of arrests and incarcerations.

Progress also continues in the U.S. and along our borders. The assistance of the National Guard has allowed the Customs Service to significantly increase the number of examinations of containers arriving in the U.S. from source and transit countries. The Active military forces and the National Guard have rendered significant support to Border Patrol, Customs and

local law enforcement agencies along the land borders. The establishment of JTF-6 has enhanced our ability to disrupt illegal drug smuggling in the Southwest Border Area. The Department has substantially increased intelligence support to counterdrug efforts. The number of valid (legally supportable) requests by law enforcement agencies for support (e.g., operational support, equipment loans or transfers, intelligence support and permanent or temporary personnel support) that are being filled is now close to 100%. Some 97% of all of the requests by law enforcement agencies for support were filled within the time frame requested, and the level of support provided compared to the level requested, was close to 100%.

The perception of the Department's performance by the law enforcement agencies that were supported in FY 90 is also uniformly positive. The comments of certain of the law enforcement agencies contained in letters which I have received in recent weeks are particularly relevant:

"The effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of the DoD efforts in support of FBI operations have been outstanding." (FBI)

"The contribution provided by the National Guard in narcotic interdiction efforts has been invaluable." (U.S. Customs Service)

"Overall, DoD's support has been outstanding. The Regional Logistical Support Centers, though new, have great potential and are rated as outstanding by DEA field offices. Based on input from the field, effectiveness and operational impact range from excellent to outstanding. The overall fiscal impact is outstanding. We are doing things we otherwise could not afford to do. DoD support also means keeping more agents on the street." (Drug Enforcement Administration)

- "ADNET is an unqualified success story. It has been well received in the field." (U.S. Coast Guard)
- "After receiving comments from our operational divisions affected by DoD drug policy assistance programs, I can assure you each has reported the same opinion -- DoD assistance has been nothing less than outstanding." (U.S. Marshals Service)

Programs and Budget for FY 92-93

A major focus of DoD budgetary efforts for counternarcotics policies and programs has been the incorporation of these policies and programs into the Department's Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). To permit more direct accountability and more effective management of anti-drug funds, a Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account was established on November 10, 1989.

On March 1, 1990, I was directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to submit a plan and FY 1992- 1997 program for all counternarcotics activities and to "establish DoD counternarcotics objectives and define a strategy for achieving those objectives." I was also directed to prepare the drug interdiction and counter-drug activities budget. After consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD principals and Directors of Defense Agencies, I submitted the Department's first counternarcotics Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to Secretary Cheney on April 10, 1990. That POM provided a foundation for the FY 92-93 Budget Estimate Submission and it assisted in the development of the relevant portions of the President's recently

announced National Drug Control Strategy III.


The FY 1992 and 1993 Justification of Budget Estimates provides to the Congress detailed descriptions of the various activities of the Department's counternarcotics program. The program is a comprehensive, multi-faceted, counter-drug program that exploits the requisite capabilities of our Military Departments and Defense Agencies. We believe that the program is aggressive and balanced and will enable the DoD to perform both the missions that have been assigned to it by law and by the policies that have been developed to assist in the implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy.

As the National Drug Control Strategy has evolved, so also has the Department's program of implementation. Our program was procurement oriented in FY 89 and FY 90. The program for FY 91, FY 92, and FY 93 is more heavily focused on operations and maintenance. This has been expected and is reflective of the maturation of the Department's program.

Table I reflects the development of the program (by Activity Group) since the three major counternarcotics missions were assigned to the Department by statute in FY 89.

Table II reflects the same development by appropriation.

DoD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM BY ACTIVITY GROUP




	FY89 ACTUAL	FY90 ACTUAL	FY91 EST	FY92 REQUEST	FY93 REQUEST
DETECT/MONITORING	198.2	407.9	551.6	590.4	649.4
C3I INTEGRATION	59.1	27.5	56.0	9.7	9.7
NATIONAL GUARD (TITLE 32)	27.6	107.4	163.3	154.4	168.9
OPTEMPO	71.8	119.5	227.2	302.2	323.5
DEMAND REDUCTION	82.1	83.5	86.0	101.9	97.9
ACTIVITY TOTAL	438.8	745.8	1084.1	1158.6	1249.4
					

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Table II reflects the same development by appropriation.

DoD COUNTER-DRUG PROGRAM
BY APPROPRIATION



	FY89 ACTUAL	FY90 ACTUAL	FY91 EST	FY92 REQUEST	FY93 REQUEST
OPERATION & MAINTENANCE	229.1	335.6	586.4	808.8	844.0
PROCUREMENT	189.8	328.7	319.3	138.8	200.5
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST & EVALUATION		22.5	59.0	76.9	65.6
NATIONAL GUARD & RES COMPONENT, PAY/ALLOW	19.9	55.3	119.4	134.1	139.3
MILITARY CONSTRUCT	----	3.7	----	----	----
APPROPRIATIONS TOTAL	436.8	745.8	1084.1	1158.8	1249.4
	*****	*****	*****	*****	*****

CONCLUSION

During a period of extraordinary, historic change in the strategic environment, a period in which it has been engaged in armed conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf and grappled with severe budgetary constraints, the Department of Defense has also become vigorously involved in a wide range of activities related to the performance of the new and very complex counternarcotics mission. It is difficult to make precise short-term evaluations of the effect that the DoD efforts are having on the Nation's drug epidemic, but the law enforcement agencies that the Department supports are uniform in their praise of those efforts. The available objective data and more subtle indicators also suggest that DoD has been, and continues to be very successful in the performance of the specific and very important, but limited support missions and programs that have been assigned to it by law, the President's National Drug Control Strategy and the Secretary's policy guidance. The counternarcotics mission continues as a "high priority national security mission" of the Department of Defense.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you for your very enlightening testimony.

Mr. Coughlin has to return to the Appropriations Committee, and so the Chair would yield to him for questioning at this time.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would be interested in knowing to what extent you believe that drug traffickers and growers rely on air transport to transship coca products out of the growing areas and chemicals into the growing areas.

Would it be correct to assume if the coca producers were denied the use of air, it would be substantially more difficult for them to conduct their business?

Secretary DUNCAN. I'm sorry, what was denied?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Denied the use of air transit, would it be substantially more difficult for them to conduct their business?

Secretary DUNCAN. No doubt about that. Certainly they use aircraft to a great extent.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Do you think it is a good thing the Peruvian Air Force has shot down several drug trafficking planes?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, our policy is pretty clear on that issue. It starts to become a little unclear with respect to what happens in foreign countries. But Secretary Cheney has been very clear that from our own standpoint, we will not be engaged in shooting down aircraft. And as far as what happens in foreign countries, you know, their sovereignty is what governs. We are in the business of teaching them skills that they need to fight the drug traffickers, but we also make it a point when we have our military training teams go in to foreign countries, to give them assistance in the way of teaching; we make sure that they are aware of our view of human rights and those kinds of things.

And of course, our country is a party to the Chicago Convention, which prohibits shooting down of civil aircraft. So, you know, we are walking a delicate line there without interfering with the sovereignty of a foreign nation. But the Secretary's policies on that issue, as far as the use of American Armed Forces, is very clear.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have DOD personnel given technical assistance to initiatives of the Peruvian Air Force, if they have requested it, in terms of their ability to shoot down drug trafficking planes?

Secretary DUNCAN. I am not aware of any law or policy decision that would prevent, or has prevented us from giving assistance in the way of advice, or consultation to any nation on threats to its national security, appropriate threats.

Having said that, you know, again what our policy is—we have tried to make it clear, but there is nothing in the law, or our policy that would prevent us from giving such advice to any country, if it has, you know, threats to its security.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I just want to, again, congratulate you for the effort that DOD is making. I know to some extent that effort was interrupted by the Persian Gulf situation. I hope that counternarcotics programs will be restored to their full prewar level.

Do you anticipate that they will?

Secretary DUNCAN. With respect, sir, I don't think I would agree with your conclusion that our effort was interrupted. It is certainly fair to say that we had a lot of military power projected to South-

west Asia. But the detection and monitoring mission, as important as it is, is one of several missions that our Department performs.

And, for example, most of our programs weren't even affected, except in this way: We found, for example, that to the extent that we had to use active duty forces in Southwest Asia, that perhaps the previous year had been used more in fighting drugs, we found ways to go around that—Joint Task Force 6. We found ways to use reserve forces, Federal reserve forces, to fill in the gap. And it was a very successful use of Federal reserve forces. We found new ways to use National Guard forces.

So, maybe we are using different kinds of soldiers and sailors and so forth in the fight, but we have found that we are pretty successful when we have to take one kind of resource, like active duty soldiers to go somewhere else, of replacing that resource with another one.

So we have tried to keep the intensity up. I won't say that it wasn't affected, it was affected, but I don't subscribe to the view that our efforts were any less energetic, or less intense. I don't believe that they were.

Mr. COUGHLIN. I am not relating to the energy. I think that there were some assets, radar for example, some assets in terms of vessels that were used down there that had to be used elsewhere, and understandably so.

My question was whether those were being put back into the war on drugs?

Secretary DUNCAN. There are only a limited number of assets that were out of the area for any period of time. And the answer is, yes, but we also have requirements worldwide for some of those assets. And it is a matter that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the law enforcement agencies review on a very regular basis. But I anticipate, yes, they will be coming back.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Just in conclusion, let me say that the committee, or at least this member of the committee, having had a chance to see some of your operations firsthand, couldn't be more impressed by what our military forces can do when they put their mind to it down there. It is really remarkable. And it has been a great asset to the war on drugs. We congratulate you and thank you for what you are doing in that area.

Secretary DUNCAN. I appreciate your comments, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. I would like to join Mr. Coughlin in his observation about the effectiveness of DOD in this area.

The Chair has received a number of complaints from members about our policy of recognizing members to inquire based on their arrival at the committee. And since I arrived late, for the first time, I can understand the nature of their complaint. I would yield now to Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly would yield back to you and allow you to make any questions you desire.

Secretary Duncan, it is impressive what the military is doing. And, interestingly enough, with the rescission of the C3I, as you go through your chart, do you have any idea how this will impact on local law enforcement and State agencies? Are they going to have to come up with additional funds?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, the answer is we have learned several things in the last 2 years that will make the drug fight easier for local law enforcement agencies once they find out about them. For example, we have established regional offices, so that instead of having to come through the bureaucracy in Washington, local law enforcement agencies can go to our regional offices and define their needs. And we can, perhaps, find out what resources we have that might be able to help them in an expedited manner.

We are learning how to work with them and what their needs are, and what resources we may have that meet their unique needs. They, perhaps, may define a need, as I said earlier as a particular resource, and perhaps we have something that will help them do it better.

Some curious things have happened in the last year. We now have conducted operations, some major operations that have involved active duty forces, National Guard forces, State law enforcement forces, local law enforcement agencies. And we are finding out how to work together, whether it is in marijuana eradication, or whether it is some kind of an operation after cocaine traffickers. But we are finding that as we get to know each other, we are being able, we think, to be more and more effective with helping them, both in tangible resources and in just learning how to work with them to effectuate operational ends that we both want.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you. That's interesting.

I also was impressed with your speaking about the DARE Program, which I think is one of the better programs in the education system, both in this country and it is inspiring to find that you are doing this at military schools throughout the world. And we have had great success with that, so I do hope that you will continue that. And your statement that our young soldiers are good role models for these young kids and the military policemen, I think is excellent.

I would like to ask you about the aerostat system which has taken forever to get in place, and it is still not fully in place. I understand that the Department of Defense will be taking over a portion of this operation. However, you will not be taking over the aerostats that the Coast Guard controls.

Wouldn't it be more efficient to take them all over and have this thing operating under one head?

Secretary DUNCAN. I am sorry, I was checking to see—that issue is moving so fast I lose track if I don't stay current on it.

Mr. LEWIS. I don't think it is moving fast. It has been going on since 1980.

Secretary DUNCAN. As you probably know, Mr. Lewis, we have taken over the Customs aerostats.

And your question is the Coast Guard, that is being worked here in the House right now. Basically, our view of it is whoever pays for it, probably ought to operate and manage it. There is no—I guess I am missing precisely, what is your specific question on that?

We are in the process of waiting to see what Congress does with it.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, you are not going to take over the Coast Guard's operation of the aerostats, but you are going to take over the rest of them, isn't that correct?

Secretary DUNCAN. That is the status as of right now, yes, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, why wouldn't you take over the Coast Guard and have it all under one authority, rather than have it split between the Coast Guard and your agency?

Secretary DUNCAN. It is not clear to me—this is a personal view—it is not clear to me why, as a matter of policy, all of the aerostats need to be under one particular department. I mean, if there are some operational goals that can be accomplished, they have not been brought to my attention.

So, it looks, from our standpoint, that we should be comfortable—as we are with the Customs Service controlling their P-3 aircraft—with the Coast Guard controlling its aerostats.

What we don't want to do is to, one, become a law enforcement agency. I don't think that is the intent of the Congress and it is not our policy. But we do want to aggressively support the law enforcement agency. And there is a fine line there, if there is some operational reason why we can accomplish more doing something, I am always openminded to hear those things. But if it is just a matter of coming to the Department of Defense and suggesting that the Department of Defense with a budget that was originally predicted 5 years ago to be \$479 billion and is now less than \$300 billion, at a time that we are having to face a rapidly changing strategic situation—if there is a suggestion that we simply become a lending agency, or bank, I am not interested in that.

But I am very interested in supporting the law enforcement agencies with whatever assets we have that will accomplish operational ends that we both want. And if there is some operational reason for doing it, I am openminded on that issue. It has not been brought to my attention that there would be some benefit to the detection and monitoring mission.

Mr. LEWIS. I tend to agree with what you are saying, but also, having been involved with the aerostat program since it started, basically in 1983, we have had nothing but problems with that system and the lack of application in getting the systems online and getting the systems in the air—they have been falling out of the air. And then we have to go into a study to find out why they sprung a leak.

We had to buy specialized look-down radar for these things. And it would seem to me that—I have nothing against the Coast Guard, I think they do a fine job. But it would just seem to me that if you are going to set up a perimeter defense, you want to have it under one control, rather than have it split between two. And that's the reason I raised that question.

Secretary DUNCAN. That's an interesting question because it has come up in all of my hearings over the last 2 years. People—I guess it is just difficult for many members to see why—how we could be successful without having a single person, or a single agency in charge of all operations. And I guess it is surprising to some that we don't. We just discussed this issue at length this week, when General Powell hosted a meeting of all of our commanders in chief and we invited all of the law enforcement agencies over.

We are finding that because people in the law enforcement agencies and the Armed Forces are so good, and they are professionals, it may defy common sense in the minds of some people, but they have learned to coordinate and to cooperate in ways that are very rewarding.

I constantly ask our operational commanders, because I am constantly asked by Congress, don't you need to be in charge? Doesn't DOD need to be controlling this, or controlling that? I keep going back on a regular basis to our operational commanders and they keep saying every week and every month that the coordination continues to improve. And a single control point is just not necessary.

So, I have recommended to the Congress that so long as the trend continues upward and so long as professionals are learning how to work with each other at this rate, why do we need to address the question of placing a single agency in charge? That's why I am always interested in being in charge if there is an operational reason that will help us accomplish our mission more. I am open-minded to the idea. But just to be in charge for the sake of being in charge, and certainly just to be in charge so we can fund some particular program, I am not terribly interested in that.

But I look, frankly, to the professionals who are the operators day-to-day for recommendations in that regard. At this point I am very encouraged, and I am happy to report to the Congress, that they are working together very, very well.

I will leave the Coast Guard and the law enforcement agencies an opportunity to talk about that themselves. But from our perspective, it is working very well and increasingly better.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, Secretary Duncan, I guess what you are saying is probably right, from the perspective that you look at it. But the problems we have had over the years have been a lack of coordination in an agency. And I just look at the Persian Gulf, Operation Desert Storm as a real good example—you had the Marines, you had the Air Force, and you had the Navy, all under Schwarzkopf, and then Schwarzkopf to Powell and then Cheney, it seemed to work pretty damned well. And it would seem to me it would in the drug program the same way.

Secretary DUNCAN. But it is very difficult for me to readily leap to a conclusion that the way one fights a tank war and an air war in Southwest Asia is automatically the way one fights a counter-drug war in the Caribbean and elsewhere, when we are in a supporting role.

In Southwest Asia we were in charge. But here we are in a supporting role. And, I hope you will appreciate the difficulty we find ourselves in by law, limited to a supporting role and by tradition, and properly so. I must tell you that I have talked to Admiral Edney as recently as this week, who is our commander in chief in the Atlantic, and who is the fellow on the hot spot. He feels very strongly that the cooperation, the rate of cooperation, continues to increase. And he is very optimistic and upbeat about the ability of the Department of Defense to work with all of the law enforcement agencies, without reaching the ultimate issue of whether some one agency has to be in charge.

So, as long as I hear that from the operators, I am open to any kinds of new suggestions, but I am guided primarily in my decisions by what the day-to-day operators recommend to us.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Inhofe.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you.

Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me take just a little different approach along this same line, because there is a lot of confusion out there, I think both on the Hill and in the eyes of the public that we have to answer to in the interdiction program as to who is doing what. It is confusing because it is multijurisdictional; where does Customs leave off and Coast Guard start in defense? And as you have mentioned, you are not in the law enforcement end, but you are supportive.

You don't hear about Blue Lightning very much anymore. I notice it is going down in Mr. McDermott's testimony. But I went down, when I was first elected, in the infant stages of the Blue Lightning Program in Miami and went through it. And at that time this is the first time in my some 25 years of experience, that I saw what appeared to be—and maybe just appeared to be, because I was a Member of Congress walking in—total cooperation between all of the Coast Guard, Customs, Defense, local, and county jurisdictions. And I was very much impressed in terms of the interdiction program that was there.

Now, we don't—maybe some of the sex appeal has worn off it, but is that cooperation still continuing today? Is that program reaching your expectations? And what comments do you have to make about that program?

Secretary DUNCAN. Sir, are you limiting your comments to the drug detection program, or over the entire program?

Mr. INHOFE. My comments are about the cooperative program there that involves the DOD, and everybody else down there in the interdiction program, in the Caribbean.

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, the answer is, yes. As a matter of fact, it has exceeded my expectations. I did not predict that we would have this much improvement in this short a time, to be candid about it. And that cooperation extends not just throughout the Caribbean for the detection and monitoring mission, but even down along the southwest border where Joint Task Force 6, our operational command at Fort Bliss, is working through Operation Alliance with State, local, and Federal law enforcement agencies.

I have had firsthand conversations with people from some of the law enforcement, Federal law enforcement agencies who came over to us within weeks after we were assigned the new statutory missions, and tried to start aggressively implementing the President's strategy. Frankly, they were scared to death about what the implications were. They were concerned that the Department of Defense might become a super law enforcement agency. They were concerned that we would take over their roles and their missions, and so forth.

And all I could say at that point was "trust us, give us a chance to work. We've got a lot of first-rate professionals. We are not in the business of taking over your agency and let's see what develops."

I have had those very same senior people from the law enforcement agencies come back to me, not 6 months later, amazed—not appalled, amazed at how much progress had been made in a short period of time. I keep checking that issue because I keep being asked about it by Congress.

I am not going to suggest to this committee that in every circumstance there hasn't been some breakdown somewhere, but I will tell you that in talking to both the law enforcement agencies, as we do on a regular basis, and talking to our own people, we are finding that border patrol agents and Marine Corps squads don't know anything about each other when they first meet. But, as they are trained together and as they start to operate together, the professionalism starts to shine through. And pretty soon a lot of that turf stuff that I have heard so much about disappears. I won't say that it has been eliminated, but I will tell you the professionals whose advice I respect the most, tell me that it is really working.

So long as they continue to give me those kinds of reports, then I will continue to report to you what they say. My judgment right now is that the level of cooperation and coordination is much better than I would have expected. And it is as good as anybody could reasonably expect in the short time our Department has been involved.

Mr. INHOFF. It appears to be that way, Mr. Secretary. And I, of course, want to compliment everyone who plays a part in that down there.

The most difficult thing to do is to measure degrees of success in any kind of an interdiction program. At that time I asked the question down there, and I asked it, in fact, before this committee a number of years ago, what kind of success are we having?

At that time they said there is no way of measuring the percentage that is stopped that is coming in, even if you confine it to the Caribbean area. But they are toying with the figure of about 12 percent, they felt at that time.

Have you developed any kind of technique to measure success in the last 2 or 3 years in the interdiction program?

Secretary DUNCAN. That is a fair question and it is a very difficult question for us. It is a question that I am particularly sensitive to because as a Vietnam veteran, I well remember those artificial body counts that came out of Vietnam. I do not want to get in the business of judging our success, or our performance, by artificial objective criteria which don't relate very much to what we are trying to accomplish.

So, what I did this year is attack that issue. How do we tell how we are doing on rather a broad basis?

Certainly objective data are important, for example, when the Customs Service tells me that because we are using the National Guard to help the Customs Service inspect containers at ports of entry, that they have been able to inspect—they are able to inspect now 14 percent of all incoming containers, instead of 4 percent. That is a piece of objective information that I am perfectly comfortable giving to the Congress and it shows that we are making a big inroad on inspecting containers.

But that doesn't tell all of the story. It is also fair, I think, to look at some anecdotal stories from time to time. I have included a

couple in my written statement, to show just how big a particular success may be in an interdiction mission. Maybe we won't have one that is quite that big for 6 months, but I did want to share that with the Congress.

I decided that because we are in a support role, the best method of measurement, or at least one that is very, very important to me, of how we are doing, is to ask the people that we are supporting.

So this year for the first time I directed that we literally go out and talk at length, and send questionnaires, and meet personally with all of the law enforcement agencies that we are charged to support. I said I didn't want a bunch of soft stuff, I want to know how we can improve. What are we doing wrong? But I also want to know their perception of how we are doing in supporting them.

And I am very happy to report—I included comments at the back of my written statement by some of the law enforcement agencies—I wouldn't begin to suggest that we are doing perfectly, but if measured by the comments of the people that we are supposed to be supporting, we are meeting their needs in a way that, perhaps, surprises them. What I look for is how we can do a better job. And we will continue to do that on an annual basis, ask what we can do this year that, perhaps, is different from last year, because the needs have changed.

But a combination of all of those factors gives me a sense that we are performing our mission very well.

One of the challenges that we face, and let's be candid about this, when the Armed Forces go in and win a ground war in 100 hours and have the magnificent victory in Southwest Asia, it is easy for many people to leap to the conclusion that we can also win the drug war in 100 hours with no collateral damage, that is, that it will be cheap and it will be over quickly.

This is a different kind of fight. This one is going to go on for a while. But I remain convinced that if we stick to it and remain committed to it, as we have, and continue to see the kinds of improvements that Mr. Martinez, Governor Martinez, has described in recent weeks, that ultimately there will be a time when this fight will be over and we will have won. It may not be quite as clear as a surrender of the Iraqi Army, but I think we are on track.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. de Lugo.

Mr. DE LUGO. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on a very powerful, very impressive statement.

Secretary DUNCAN. Thank you.

Mr. DE LUGO. I would caution that, first of all, we all have to be tremendously impressed by the military, particularly our military today which I think is the finest, most professional military that the world has ever seen. I don't think that is an overstatement. But I want to assure you that this is not working all the way down.

I live in the Caribbean, the Caribbean is my home. And I assure you that there is not that cooperation. There are selective areas of success, for instance in Puerto Rico we have a Coast Guard Commandant who is doing a wonderful job, Abbott Clink—an organization that has been set up which brings together the Federal and local law enforcement agencies, and they are working well together.

My impression is that the law enforcement work that has been done, Blue Lightning that was referred to earlier, is a tremendous success in Florida. But that has caused problems for us as the drug lords have moved their routes down into the Eastern Caribbean. And I can tell you that in the area that I represent, which is the U.S. Virgin Islands, there is not that cooperation between Federal and local agencies. In fact, not only are many of the local agencies not cooperating with the Federal agencies, but the Federal agencies are fighting over turf.

And so it is not working everywhere.

Secretary DUNCAN. I was speaking specifically of the Department of Defense, not the relationship between Federal and local law enforcement agencies, over which I have no jurisdiction.

Mr. DE LUCA. Fine.

I want to say for the record, and we will address these questions, you know, with later witnesses, but we have a lot of small, independent nations down in the Caribbean and most of them are very poor. A great ally of this Nation was Prime Minister Eugenia Charles of Dominica. The word we are receiving is that they are really moving into Dominica. Dominica has virtually no resources. This is a place where, you know, there are laborers that are paid \$15 to \$25 a week. So, you can imagine that this is a virgin territory for the drug lords.

And I am wondering in a case like Dominica, or Antigua, or Saint Kitts, what resources is the Defense Department able to give to these small independent nations?

Secretary DUNCAN. Let me answer your question broadly first. We know that as we become increasingly successful in our detection and monitoring mission, it will cause the drug traffickers to change their methods of operation, to adapt new procedures, to accept more risks, to engage in operations that are riskier to them. It will drive up the cost of their operations.

And, indeed, that is one of our specific and expressed objectives because they become more vulnerable to law enforcement agencies when all of that occurs.

The last 2 or 3 years you could see much more trafficking over toward the coast of Florida. Then, as we became increasingly successful, it shifted to the land border of the Southwest United States and Mexico. And we will continue to see, in my opinion, as we become increasingly successful, new methods of operation, new trafficking patterns, and so forth.

And so our program is designed to be as flexible as we can make it, because the needs of any country, or the needs of any area in 1989, are likely to be much different than they are in 1992. So, we reassess it on an annual basis.

Basically, we look to the countries involved, in the case of foreign countries, or to law enforcement agencies to define for us what the needs are. And then we try to decide what we can do to meet those needs. And, of course, as I say, the needs will vary from year to year as we become increasingly successful.

So, as they define their needs for us, then we address what we can do within the resources Congress has given us to meet those specific needs. We continually engage in a dialog. For example, the commander in chief of the Southern Command meets on a regular

basis with all of our ambassadors to the Caribbean nations, to the South American nations, and so forth. And he hears from those folks about what they need. We look to our ambassadors as the point people in the various respective areas to define what their needs are. Then it simply has to compete for other needs from other nations.

And the recommendations come up to us as to how our resources might be spent. But that is the way the system works on an annual basis.

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Clinger.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You raised the point about your anticipation that there will be changing patterns and changing routes because of our beginning to put pressure on and becoming effective at monitoring and interdicting and this causes the shift. We can anticipate that as a part of the long-range future.

Over the time that you have been involved, have you seen that? For example, we are told now that much is being routed through Europe, and therefore, into the United States. Has there been an increase, for example, in, or have your monitoring activities picked up an increase across the Canadian border?

Secretary DUNCAN. The answer is yes, there have been some increased activities. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons we are working very closely with the Canadian Royal Mounted Police and others. I fully expect that as we become increasingly successful, the patterns will change; they have to change.

Now, what does that do for us?

My own view is that ultimately the drug fight will be won, of course, and this is rather obvious, when there is no demand for drugs. And what we are doing, among a lot of other things, is giving hope. We are buying time for our demand reduction programs, like the DARE Program and many others, to take effect. And there are some encouraging signs along those lines.

But meanwhile, the traffic patterns are going to continue to change. And our job, as I see it, is to have the flexibility to adapt our resources and our methods of operation as the trafficking patterns change, to change our methods of operation and apply different resources as necessary.

As they become more sophisticated—we are dealing with a very sophisticated enemy here, make no mistake about it. They have the resources to buy good equipment and so forth, but we also have a high degree of confidence in our own forces and we will just continue to do what we have to do to keep them off balance as best we can.

Mr. CLINGER. That was my next question, because we used to say we were losing the war because we were not applying, or did not have the resources dedicated to the effort that the opposition was doing.

Do you feel now that, in terms of sophistication, command, control, communications, et cetera, that we are on par with, or equal to, or better than the opposition?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, the answer is, yes. I mean, our forces are outstanding. And I know all the members of the committee ap-

preciate that and agree with it. But it is also a fact that we are facing a problem that is uniquely different than the one we faced in Southwest Asia.

The borders of the United States are very, very large. One can hide significant amounts of illicit drugs in legitimate cargo coming across normal, regular legitimate ports of entry. To show you the magnitude of the problem, I think I was told by one of the law enforcement agencies that just in the port of El Paso alone, something like 800 legitimate containers cross that port of entry on a daily basis. And it may take one or two people much of a day to search a container that contains good cargo.

So long as people understand the complexity and the magnitude of the problem, certainly we have the resources to attack it. And if good intentions, high energy, and a good game plan are any measure of how we are going to perform, I think we've got it. It is going to require patience and stick-to-itiveness over a period of time and, ultimately, we will reach the point where the demand reduction will be such that we will say, "My goodness, we won." But it is going to take time.

Mr. CLINGER. I couldn't agree with you more. Interdiction is not going to be the total answer; we have got to have the demand reduction if we are going to win this war.

Let me just add one final—

Mr. RANGEL. Go ahead.

I would just—it is a large committee, and so many members have to leave, but go ahead, because we very seldom get this far down to you.

Mr. CLINGER. Very briefly. There is some concern about what has happened in Colombia in the last couple of days, the question whether they are maintaining their commitment to this.

What is your assessment of this? In other words, DOD is in there, you work with the Colombian military. We have dedicated a fair amount of resources to that effort, can you just briefly comment on this?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, we are very sensitive to the sacrifices and the risks that Colombia has already made. They have suffered a lot. Our preference would be that they retain extradition. But our long-term goals are the same. I guess, from our standpoint, it is a wait-and-see approach. If the drug traffickers who turned themselves in are convicted, we will be very interested in the nature of the sentences. We want to make sure that justice is, in fact, done. And will there be a perception that justice is done?

But it is premature to reach a final conclusion because the program is just starting. So, I guess we have a wait-and-see attitude. Of course, that is primarily a law enforcement question. The Department of Defense doesn't directly get involved in issues involving extradition and so forth.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Hochbrueckner.

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, on page 15 of your testimony you state that, "All cocaine consumed in the United States, over 90 percent of the im-

ported marijuana, and some 30 percent of all heroin used in this country comes from Latin America and the Caribbean."

So, it seems to me, obviously, this is a very important area for us to concentrate our military interdiction forces on.

Now, also on page 14 you refer to use of patrols and posts, and also, on page 15 you talk about having used seismic detection to help detect tunneling from Mexico to the United States.

Let's review this drug exclusion curtain from the Atlantic to Mexico to the Pacific in terms of what we are doing now. It seems to me over the water we have had a program for quite a few years now, in terms of the Coast Guard interdiction, using E-2C radar aircraft, the kind we use on our carriers. I understand that the program has been reasonably successful, and I would certainly like to know what cooperation you have had with the Navy in terms of actually using the E-2C's off the carriers for the purpose of detecting small boats and planes which might be attempting to smuggle dope through the Caribbean, and certainly on the Pacific coast, too.

And I guess my first question for you would be if you were to ask the Navy at Mayport and the Navy in San Diego, to integrate this drug detection program with their normal training program, which as a former Navy person, seems to me would make a lot of sense—in fact, it would probably be very interesting to the Navy, instead of just being out there playing war games—instead they could actually be assigned a sector that they would try and detect small boats and planes that might be attempting to smuggle dope.

If you talked to the commanders at Mayport and San Diego, and asked them to set up regular training flights, whose purpose was drug interdiction, would they do that?

Secretary DUNCAN. Oh, I don't have any doubt about it.

To answer your question about E-2's off carriers, the answer is, yes, we do, from time to time, as carrier battle groups come into the Caribbean for their workup, before they go on a deployment. If there are some assets that we can use, we do. But more importantly, we have Navy E-2's at Howard Air Force Base in Panama. And in a given timeframe we are using a combination of all kinds of aircraft, the E-3's, the P-3's to Customs from the Navy, from wherever, all kinds of sensors that we use on a regular basis.

Now, one of the encouraging things that has happened about training is that, yes, we are finding that using military assets in the drug fight can be a very good form of training. And it is more than just the technical aspects. For example, I once had a senior officer at NORAD tell me that the officers come in, the staff personnel come into NORAD, there in Cheyenne Mountain, in Colorado Springs, and for 40 years they have been looking over the North Pole and elsewhere for strategic missiles that might be coming. And our success is demonstrated by the fact that they have never come. But now they have a different kind of enemy. They are looking for low, slow flying aircraft coming across the Caribbean. This presents challenges that are uniquely different than looking for strategic missiles coming from another direction.

And it is really challenging; they like that.

What I try to do is to look for ways in which we can engage in normal military training missions and help the drug fight. It doesn't always translate, however. For example, as successful as

the searching of containers has been with the use of the National Guard, it is very difficult to draw any connection between searching containers with the Customs Service and the military skills that are required to fight conflicts.

So, I am weighing the needs of the law enforcement agencies, and constantly looking for ways in which we can engage in the training that is required to keep our readiness high for war fighting missions, but which will also affect and help the law enforcement agencies.

So to the extent that anybody has any good ideas along those lines, I welcome them. But most of the commanders for E-2's and otherwise have been very cooperative and very helpful in that regard.

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Could we request a report from you as to some of the specific uses that you have put the Navy, Air Force, et cetera—you say at Howard—in terms of specifically allocating those resources for drug interdiction?

Secretary DUNCAN. Sure, I would be happy to.

Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER. Let me just move to the overland part. Obviously, as was raised earlier, there is a concern about the use of aerostats. It would seem to me that one of the things that we did learn from the Persian Gulf war was that the J-Stars Program, which as you know is a very sophisticated radar that can detect anything, any truck or what have you that is moving—certainly, it would seem to me, we might want to bring those J-Star aircraft and utilize them to detect the overland movement of trucks, say, from Mexico to the United States.

It would seem to me you might want to consider using that asset since you can see anything that is moving with that particular sophisticated radar. And, of course, as you know, they are being produced out of Florida anyway, so the assets are readily available in that region.

So, I might suggest you utilize that until the aerostat program finally—

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, there is no asset that we are not willing to look at, considering of course, one of the advantages of the aerostat is that it is terribly cost effective. The cost of keeping some of our assets operating is quite high, and an aerostat is much less expensive. So, we balance the effectiveness of any particular asset versus the relative cost, because right now we've got major budgetary challenges. We are trying to accomplish our mission with decreasing resources. So, we've got to be concerned about cost effectiveness to make sure that the American taxpayer gets the maximum bang for the buck on whatever we use to fight drugs.

Mr. RANGEL. At this point we will proceed to Mr. Andrews, of New Jersey. And if you have to go and vote, Mr. Oxley, who will be next, you will take the balance of your time, and if you are not able to complete your questioning, then we will return to you.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have a very brief question, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for your testimony.

Put this in focus on a more commonsense term, the question we have to answer when we go home is, "What are we buying for this billion dollars?" And I am fully cognizant of two points that I think

you make very persuasively. The first is that we are very early in the effort. And the second is that the role the DOD plays is a supportive role of other agencies that have the lead role.

On page 39 of your testimony you mention that you want to try to evolve measurements against realistic standards, one that measures DOD performance against the specific and very important, but limited, support missions and programs that have been assigned to it.

What might those standards look like? I guess what I am asking is this, when you come back next year, or the year after that, or the year after that, how can we tell how well you are doing? What will the objective criteria be that will tell us whether you are doing a good job, or a poor one?

I am sure it will be a good one, but I want you to tell me how we can tell if it will be a good one.

Secretary DUNCAN. I would first ask the law enforcement agencies themselves. First of all, we are talking about a question that is not one that lends itself to the use of a formula, or an equation. It is impossible, in my opinion, to say that there is a magic formula, so that if we plug in this information, using this equation, it will spit out a letter of C+ or A-, or whatever for a grade, for how the Department of Defense is doing.

Ultimately, it is important to me that we ask the law enforcement agencies, is the Department of Defense providing the kind of assistance that helps you effectuate your job? And if not, why not? And if they are, let's continue on as above.

So, the law enforcement agencies would be the first place.

Also, as I said before, while we talk to the law enforcement agencies, it is fair to keep track of certain kinds of data, such as last summer's Operation Wipe Out in Hawaii. One of the problems we dealt with before, with some of the South American countries, was they were saying we know you are big in having us solve our problem, but there are many States in the United States that are large net exporters of marijuana.

So, we engaged in Operation Wipe Out. The State of Hawaii is now a net importer. We destroyed a large number of marijuana plants and very successfully, like 90 percent of the crop in 1 year. You know, that is not a formalistic thing, but that is a very important factor.

And I guess the cumulative effect of all of those kinds of things will help the Congress decide whether it is all worth it.

Mr. ANDREWS. If I can ask you, at the top of page 4 you say, "We should ask what the relative data indicate about our success in detecting and monitoring potential aerial and maritime drug traffickers."

What do the data indicate?

Secretary DUNCAN. The data indicate that we are able to detect larger numbers than we were in the past. We are increasingly able to determine out of the large volume of contacts that are detected by radar and sensors, which ones of those really are targets of interest and likely to be drug traffickers.

Mr. ANDREWS. When you say larger, by what magnitude?

Secretary DUNCAN. I don't have a number to give you right now, but basically, what we are doing, we are able to focus on the ones

that are most likely to be drug traffickers. When we started we were using lots of assets in ways that turned out to be too expensive. So now, as we improve our ability with intelligence, we are a little better able to say, "these are likely to be drug traffickers."

And, for example, as I mentioned in the statement, we detected last summer and last fall, convoys of aircraft going up. We didn't do that before. That is a measurement of success. We are able to detect those kinds of things in ways that we didn't know before. And as we detect them, then we can apply other assets to make them shift their pattern, so they are not doing that again. And that is a measure of success, it is just not as objective as a formula or an equation.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DE LUGO [presiding]. While the other members are voting, and before the Chairman returns—Mr. Secretary, I think there are a couple of things we might get on the record. Would you explain to the committee the role of the United States military in Bolivia and what we hope to accomplish there?

What efforts are we making at our embassy in La Paz to ensure that the Bolivian people appreciate that our presence there is of a nonthreatening nature?

Secretary DUNCAN. I have addressed, I think, specifically, Mr. Chairman, along around pages 6 and 7 in my written statement, generally, what our objectives are in Bolivia. Much of the news that has come out of Bolivia in recent weeks, of course, has to do with the fact that we have been asked by the Government of Bolivia to help train some of the Bolivian army to fight drugs.

We have already been engaged for some time in helping train the UMOPAR which are the counternarcotics police of Bolivia. I personally visited the region a few months ago, went in to see some of our special forces teams as they actually engaged in the training. Basically, the Government of Bolivia has asked for this support. We have our military training teams discussing all kinds of things, including human rights. But if the Government of Bolivia asks for support, then we are prepared to give it to meet whatever needs they define.

At this point our ambassador down there has a very aggressive program, to work with the Bolivian Government to help them define their needs and to try to obtain the resources that we can give them to help them meet their needs. They have a very large challenge. It is a very large cocaine-producing problem.

Mr. DE LUGO. Is our ambassador down there getting the message out that the United States military is down there, trying to assist the Government of Bolivia, but not threatening the sovereignty of Bolivia? I mean, getting it out that the U.S. military is there in a nonthreatening—

Secretary DUNCAN. The answer is, yes. I understand the sensitivity is there, given the history of Bolivia. And there are some sensitivities, but I have no doubt at all that our ambassador is making that point clear in spades.

We, of course, have longstanding agreements with Bolivia that go all the way back to, I think, 1962. We are not interested in any way in interfering with the sovereignty of Bolivia. We are simply

interested in responding to the request of the Government of Bolivia for assistance as best as we can.

Mr. DE LUCA. Thank you.

The gentleman from Ohio has returned and at this time let us recognize Mr. Oxley.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first of all, to look at the charts and the reduction in military drug use is most impressive, and very encouraging. While it reflects overall society, it is good to note that in the military, drug use has been reduced from 27 percent to less than 5 percent. And, hopefully, that arrow will keep on going down. So, our congratulations.

Secretary DUNCAN. Thank you.

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Secretary, the progress that you have made, not only in this, but in the interdiction efforts, has been quite good. I can remember back when I first started on this committee, the concern that Secretary Weinberger had about getting the military involved. And there is no secret, we basically dragged Cap Weinberger kicking and screaming into the drug war.

I understood that, because he had his role to fill and at that time we had a cold war going on, and the world was different. He felt that the obligation to the American people was to modernize the military, which they did very well. The drug war was secondary, at best. And so it took some prodding from the Congress.

But in the meantime, of course, the world changed, the Berlin Wall went down, and a lot of things changed. And all of a sudden we find ourselves—the military finds itself in a situation that it is doing a mission that is second to none. And while we take some credit for it in the Congress for pushing the military in the right direction, clearly you picked up that ball and ran with it, and it has been quite successful.

So, I want to also encourage you to continue your best efforts, particularly as we shrink the military, 25 percent fewer men and women in uniform over the next 5 to 6 years. We need a change in the focus of where we are going and in the mission that the military has. Obviously the drug interdiction efforts and the antidrug war will continue within the military. I am glad to hear that, even while we are starting to see some shrinking of the military's size, the goals continue. And for that we are very grateful.

I want to ask you about the base closings, and specifically, whether it is practical to use some of those closed bases for prison facilities, or for boot camp facilities, or whatever it may be deemed appropriate at the Federal level. Perhaps even to, in some cases, turn over some of those facilities to the States.

I am sure I don't have to remind you that the lack of prison space in this country is critical.

Just the other day I saw a network program that talked about how in many States hardened criminals are being turned loose before their date of parole simply because there is no place to put them, and they have a fresh crop of people coming in. And the percentage, of course, of those increases with drug abuse and the sale of drugs.

What can we do? How can we alleviate that problem and perhaps solve the problem of insufficient prison space, with what ap-

pears to be maybe a readymade opportunity to use some of that space that we are going to be abandoning?

Secretary DUNCAN. I will answer your question, but first just a word on Secretary Weinberger though. I might simply point out that the downward trend of this military drug use curve started during his watch. And we did have, contrary to the public perception, significant assets involved in the drug fight, even prior to 1988. What we have done is throw a lot more energy at the problem and it has become a high priority mission which means we have placed much greater assets at it.

And Secretary Cheney has come out with some new policies which I think are very, very effective.

To answer your question on the—

Mr. OXLEY. If I could interject—I didn't mean that as a criticism of Weinberger, because I think Weinberger had some other fish to fry back then, and he did them very well.

And Dick Cheney, being a creature of the Congress and understanding the politics of it, and the public's desire to have the military more involved in the drug effort, was a perfect fit. To some extent Frank Carlucci, also, shared that feeling. So, that was a fairly good segue for Dick Cheney.

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, ultimately, the President—as I said before you came in—the President in his very first address to a joint session of the Congress made it clear that the Armed Forces were going to be involved in fighting drugs. The only question for us was how. And now it is clear from the drug strategy in September 1989, and we have been marching since then.

The prison question is a challenging one. You used the phrase "hardened criminals." One of the problems that we face is that most of the—with the exception of Fort Leavenworth, that comes readily to mind—most of the military prison facilities are not the type of facilities into which one puts hardened criminals because the kinds of offenses that are committed by members of the Armed Forces aren't of the same nature as those by hardened criminals engaged in drug trafficking.

So, that is one of the things that poses a challenge. But we have worked very closely with the Bureau of Prisons to see what we have in the way of assets that might be available for their use. That is an ongoing dialog and we are there to support them in ways that we can, but it is not an automatic that you can use a facility that has a military incarceration facility and use that for hardened drug traffickers. It is just a different kind of facility, but we are engaged in a dialog to find out what we can do.

Mr. OXLEY. I am really talking more about the land than the facility itself. In other words, maybe this is a bad example, but Rickenbacker Air Force Base in Columbus is closest to my district and is on the list to be closed. There are quite a few acres there at Rickenbacker. I am not talking necessarily about a brig, or whatever the military calls it, but they would have the land available. For example, if the land were to be conveyed to the State of Ohio, the State might agree to build some kind of a facility. It may not even be for hardened drug offenders; maybe it would be just for teen-aged drug offenders that might need to spend some time in boot camp.

I think we could perhaps explore it with the Secretary of Defense and with the various States.

I am assuming that there are a lot of States out there that are looking for the ability to house criminals, so that they don't have the tragedy of somebody being released early and then going out and committing another crime.

On this program I watched the other night, it was just sickening. A murderer was turned loose and within 48 hours he murdered a woman and took her automobile because he was running out of gas and he needed a car. So he just went over and killed her and took her car.

That is the kind of thing that really undermines the public's confidence in the justice system and in the entire antidrug effort.

So, I would recommend anything we can do to provide more facilities for prisoners. It would be most welcome by the public.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL [presiding]. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Duncan, it is a pleasure to have you here.

I was thinking of the prisoners in the D.C. prison with drug-related crimes, or that were addicted in some way to drugs. I am totally convinced that as bad as Saddam Hussein was and is, and how important that effort was there, that we are decaying from within because of our failure to still come to grips with the drug problem.

I realize that interdiction can be a bottomless pit because there are so many different things you could do, if you had the money. I know that you have more resources, but I want to ask you for the record, do you have all the resources you need to do the job you feel you need to do?

Secretary DUNCAN. We are not bashful about asking for resources, but I was encouraged by—at least the remarks by—the House Armed Services Committee to the President's recommendation for a budget this year. We have gotten most. One of the problems that faced us last year, frankly, was not so much the number of dollars as some of the provisions that were built into law that took away our flexibility.

And if there is anything that we need almost as much as resources, it is flexibility, because things change during the course of the year. We have been very candid about that with Members of Congress and the relevant committees. And thus far it looks like the new statutes that will be passed, you know, to the extent that this part of the budget is passed, will give us flexibility that we didn't have last year. And I am very encouraged by that.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you just show the committee, very briefly, the types of flexibilities you are talking about?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, sometimes if funds are designed—if the statute says they have to be spent a certain way. And we have to go back and obtain a reprogramming, in order to shift some funding.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other examples? It is mostly spending issues?

Secretary DUNCAN. Mostly spending issues, yes, sir, mostly spending issues. But maybe the resources—I will tell you an exam-

ple that has been solved, a problem that has been solved and I am very happy about it.

One of the things the Congress did was to give us certain moneys to be used, to be spent, directly on support of law enforcement agencies. We had some problems, the law enforcement agencies didn't know how to ask for the funding. And some of the words of the statute, some of the statutory language made it very difficult. And we found that last year we could not execute all of the money that had been appropriated. That is not good.

So, we went back with the appropriate committees of Congress, and this year I am very happy to report—or last year, for the current year, we got the kind of language that will give us the flexibility to respond to law enforcement agencies' needs in a better way. At least at this point in time, it looks like we are going to be able to fully execute all of those funds during this fiscal year.

So, it is a learning process. As we gain new experience, we see a problem and we have had very good success coming to the Congress and explaining that this is our problem, and that we need help to fix it.

Mr. SHAYS. Particularly, the men and women in the Armed Forces are trained to kill, as opposed to wound, or to capture. And yet we are asking our Armed Forces to be in a position where they are like policemen, which are different skills. Do you have training programs for your men and women to orient them toward this new type of operation?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, there may be a misunderstanding here. By statute the Armed Forces of the United States cannot be directly involved in law enforcement. So the Armed Forces will not be involved in making arrests, in conducting searches and seizures. But what we do is to work closely with, for example, ships in the Caribbean, with the Coast Guard because they have that kind of authority.

Mr. SHAYS. I made an assumption though that if you were intercepting a ship, that that would be not just the Coast Guard's responsibility, but it might be the Navy's. Am I wrong about that?

Secretary DUNCAN. No, it would be the Navy's, but we would have a Coast Guard detachment on the Navy ship.

And if it is a Southwest border issue, then we may have reserve forces, or National Guard forces in Federal status, or active duty forces working with the law enforcement agency. But when it comes time to engage in the law enforcement end of the interdiction process, the arrest, and searches and seizures, that has to be done by the law enforcement agencies.

So, we are not in the business of training our people how to go in and make arrests on drug traffickers because that is up to the law enforcement agencies.

Mr. SHAYS. If you are attempting to intercept a surface ship and the ship doesn't slow down, are you authorized to sink the ship?

Secretary DUNCAN. To sink the ship?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Secretary DUNCAN. No, that is comparable to the shoot-down authority with the aircraft. The Secretary has been rather clear about that. We have a concern which I suppose surprises some in our Department, but to the extent that would require us to execute

a sentence before any arrests have been made, much less the conduct of—

Mr. SHAYS. I know the argument, but if the ship isn't stopping, or the plane isn't going where you want it, then what do you do?

Secretary DUNCAN. In international waters?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes.

Secretary DUNCAN. We turn it over to the law enforcement, we monitor it, we follow it and we do have capabilities to follow the ship. I mean, we don't have to just walk away from it, because we don't sink it. There are ways to monitor the ship and keep track of it until it is turned over to a law enforcement agency.

Mr. SHAYS. Just on this issue, if a plane were coming to our border, it was in international territory—

Secretary DUNCAN. I'm sorry?

Mr. SHAYS. If a boat, or a ship, or a plane were entering our territory, but turned around when it saw the Navy, or the Air Force, or the Coast Guard, you have—basically, you have no jurisdiction over that ship, or plane, in international waters?

Secretary DUNCAN. If it is in international waters what we do—again, we read our mission as monitoring it until it can be turned over either to a U.S. law enforcement agency, or turned over to the country to which it is returning.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Guarini.

Mr. GUARINI. I am not clear as to your answer to the question that was just asked. How would a plane behave if it were pursuing another plane that was flying over international waters but then it entered into national waters of another country, or national land? Are you just tracking it? You are not forcing it down, you are not intercepting it, so what would be the instructions as to how our Air Force should act, knowing that there are drugs and people on the plane who are criminals that we are trying to apprehend? What would be the instructions of the crew of the American plane?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, let's have a hypothetical situation here. Let's say that our sensors, whatever they may be, detect an unidentified aircraft. Let's suggest that it may even fit a kind of profile of some sort that suggests that it may be a drug trafficker.

The first problem we have as a member of the Armed Forces, is that there is no certainty that it is a drug trafficker. Short of him having a sign hanging out the window saying, "I am a drug trafficker," it is not immediately clear that it is a drug trafficker. We are trying profiles and judgment here. If the aircraft continues in international waters, we have detected it and we will continue to monitor it. We may change off different kinds of assets, it might be monitored originally by one kind of an airplane, it might be then followed by a different kind of an airplane. But we keep track of it and we follow it, and we share the information with our U.S. law enforcement agencies.

But then if it returns to another country, or if it turns back to the country it came from, then our objective is to try to share our information with the forces of that country. But we do not interfere with the sovereignty of that country. It is then up to that country's forces to take whatever action may be appropriate within that country.

Mr. GUARINI. But if you know for sure it is a drug trafficker's plane and you are certain about it, you would still use the same procedure? So if a plane enters the territorial limits of a country which does not respond, then that plane gets away?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, I am a little uneasy with absolutes. I used to be a criminal prosecutor as an assistant U.S. attorney. You tell me we are certain that a plane is a drug trafficker. There might be considerable evidence, but it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that an airplane, that may have a certain tail number, is a drug trafficker.

We hope so and we can do something about it, but it is not absolutely certain.

Mr. GUARINI. Trying to place a hypothetical question runs into a lot of difficulty, I can see.

Secretary DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. GUARINI. All right. I turn now to the free-trade agreement that we have with Mexico.

Secretary DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. GUARINI. We have approved fast track, and the President may be presenting to Congress in short order a free-trade agreement with Mexico, which means that for goods and people flown past our borders, there will be less Customs control and an easing of our surveillance of goods that will cross our border.

And of course along with the legitimate trade, there is a great deal of illegitimate trade. And I am wondering what problems you anticipate would grow out of a free-trade agreement with Mexico, knowing full well that a great deal of the cocaine and marijuana that comes into our country does, in fact, come through the border between the United States and Mexico?

Secretary DUNCAN. I am not trying to be evasive, but I am not sure I am qualified to answer the question. It sounds like it is a question that could be appropriately answered by Customs Service, or some of the law enforcement agencies.

From a military standpoint, I can tell you that cooperation with Mexico has improved considerably in recent months as they have formed the Northern Border Response Force and as they have increased their own capabilities to respond to information that we can share with them. So, I am very hopeful about the long-term prospects in working with the forces of Mexico. And that's good, because certainly that is an area where most of the traffic is coming in.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, you would have concern, of course. Would you lay any plans? Would DOD do anything regarding implementing any policies, or any strategies, knowing that there is going to be a free-trade agreement, and that there will be a laxity at the border for the crossing of goods between the two countries?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, to the extent that we would take precautions, or plans, it would be based upon our continuing dialog with law enforcement agencies and their telling us what their needs are and us responding to those requests for needs, both from a military standpoint—I am not quite sure I see the connection between a free-trade agreement and things military, except to the extent that the law enforcement agencies would need some re-

sources, or skills, or something from us, and we will be happy to provide it.

Mr. GUARINI. You enjoy good cooperation with the Mexico military? They have been cooperative in every way, as far as—

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, of course the way the Mexican Government tends to fight drugs is to use their justice department, primarily. And the answer is—as I was explaining a moment ago—yes, our relationships with the Mexicans are improving very rapidly. I think their Northern Border Response Force is becoming increasingly effective. We are doing what we can in the way of resources to help them become increasingly effective.

Mr. GUARINI. I understand you have made some outstanding hits lately and they have been effective, and it had an impact on the border.

Have you found that Mexico has requested any particular help from DOD, or are there matters that you wouldn't want to discuss at this time?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, there are pending requests, but there always are from every direction. We have already given some resources to them. And I probably wouldn't want to discuss it here, but there are some additional requests and we have a good dialog going with the Mexicans.

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, I think I will be concluding this. I want to really thank you for your patience with the committee. I want you to share with the Secretary the accolades that have been given to the Defense Department. Some people say that you came in screaming and scratching, but I say that you are here and we are proud of the outstanding job that you are doing.

We certainly don't want to take anything away from Customs and the Coast Guard. They are doing a fantastic job and they have done it historically, but you did describe DOD as the lead agency in the interdiction.

Secretary DUNCAN. That is just "lead agency" in detection and monitoring, the front part of interdiction.

Mr. RANGEL. I know that you are supporting the Coast Guard in law enforcement, what role do you play as the lead agency? What does lead really mean?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, that is an interesting question, because when the statute was passed my first question was "What does lead really mean?"

I could tell you what we meant for it to mean. We wanted someone to have the responsibility of saying that if this is a national security question, no one has any problems with DOD in responding to our national security.

And so it meant that if anything was to break down, if there were conflicts in jurisdictions, that we could grab somebody, you know, and say, "DOD, what is going wrong?"

Mr. RANGEL. So that's what we meant when we said "lead," even though we didn't want to superimpose your authority over the line organizations.

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, that's the way we approached it. And when we formed Joint Task Force 4 and Joint Task Force 5, and

put them under the command and control of our commander in chief Atlantic and commander in chief Pacific, we said go in there and assert what common sense suggests would be the lead.

What I am telling you is that the commanders in chief have come back and said it is working sufficiently well. We operate with the law enforcement agencies sufficiently well that we don't have to reach the next step of legislation that says you have operational control at this period of time, or whatever. Because we are finding that from hour to hour, operational or tactical control, tactical control might shift back and forth, depending upon the circumstances. And it gives the commanders the flexibility to respond.

Therefore, we think we have a good commonsense understanding of what lead agency means. And, ultimately, as the law enforcement agencies sit down on a regular basis, as they do with our military forces to decide how to employ specific assets in a specific area, we are finding that it works.

Mr. RANGEL. I know. We are having a legislative problem on the floor, the vote is being kept open for those who would want to change.

But, listen, if everyone is satisfied the way things are going, then certainly we are not even thinking about suggesting legislative change. My real question is do you have an overall plan that would include the support as the lead agency, as to what the up-front part of interdiction is? So that you would be able to give us a blueprint, in terms of what you are doing, what the other agencies are doing. So that we don't have to put together these different pieces of expertise?

Secretary DUNCAN. I hope I am responsive to your question. On a regular basis, literally, the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet sits down, as does the commander of Joint Task Force 4, with the Coast Guard, with the Customs Service, with other law enforcement agencies. They use the resources from C3I East and C3I West, in the case of JTF-5. They meet quarterly and they meet on a daily basis, as necessary, to decide here is what the intelligence tells us, "Here is what our best judgment is as to where we place these assets." And it is working out, because they are being able to make decisions as to where the assets should go on Tuesday versus on Wednesday, and so forth.

There seems to be no conflict there.

Mr. RANGEL. Would the Secretary know what is going on with all of these agencies?

Secretary DUNCAN. Do I know what is going on with them?

Mr. RANGEL. I am not asking you to change the operational responsibilities, to interfere, or to do anything differently, but what is going on now? As the lead agency, would I be able to go to your office in the Pentagon and look and see what is happening around our borders and around the world? To see how your support is given and what that plan is?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, sure, I get an operational briefing every Friday afternoon on exactly what we are doing.

Mr. RANGEL. I know you are OK, but I am trying to get the Congress some type of report, as to the lead agency and how it relates to the Coast Guard, to Customs, and to local law enforcement. Can

you give us a DOD-based report? I am certain it is exactly what we want, showing that everything is OK and working well.

Secretary DUNCAN. Specifically from the two joint task force commanders, they would be the ones that would have on a daily basis how the assets are being applied.

Mr. RANGEL. I want it from the Secretary's office.

Mr. Shays was talking about tracking down planes, are we having any problem in the Cuban waters, Florida and Cuba, with any drug trafficking that you know of?

Secretary DUNCAN. You ask me some questions that get into an area that I am not sure whether it is classified or not, Mr. Chairman. I am a little uneasy here. We do have some very good strong ideas about what some traffic patterns are, but I guess I am just not sure.

What I have seen—I read so much that is classified. I will be glad to talk to—

Mr. RANGEL. I don't want anything classified. Can you let me know at some later date whether it is classified?

Secretary DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Lastly, do you discuss what you are doing with Governor Martinez?

Secretary DUNCAN. Oh, yes. In fact, I just came back from a conference that was hosted by the State Department and our commander in chief Southern Command and I rode back with Governor Martinez on his plane.

He, of course, when he made his trip through South America and Central America talked to many of our tactical analysis teams and our military MTT's, who were training Bolivians, or Colombians, or whatever. So, he has had already some experience seeing what we are doing in South and Central America.

And I did have a long talk with him, not only on the airplane, but while we were in Panama. And we deal with his office on a daily basis.

Mr. RANGEL. Are you the point man for DOD on interdiction?

Secretary DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Are there Cabinet meetings on this issue?

Secretary DUNCAN. Cabinet meetings on what issue?

Mr. RANGEL. Drugs, narcotics, interdiction, crime, and education?

Secretary DUNCAN. The answer is, yes. I have attended, for example, National Security Council meetings with Secretary Cheney where the issue is drugs. Now, there are also regular meetings. We are having a meeting coming up before too long, a deputies meeting, where the deputy secretaries of the Cabinet meet on a fairly regular basis. Below that there are many levels of contacts on a daily basis. My challenge is just having enough people to keep the dialog going, because we have working group meetings hourly, and we are dealing daily, literally, with the law enforcement agencies, with the State Department.

So, yes, there are a lot of meetings.

Mr. RANGEL. Would you tell me when last you saw any public statement coming from Secretary Baker on international drug trafficking?

Secretary DUNCAN. I'm sorry, within the last year?

Mr. RANGEL. We don't get reports on the Cabinet meetings, because they are internal, but I assume that you know what each other is doing, the same way we, in Congress, know what each committee is doing. I am trying to be better informed as to what our other cabinets are doing on the same level as DOD. We all are in accord that DOD is doing an outstanding job.

I was just wondering, as relates to the international aspect of drug trafficking; the growing, the processing, and of course, the international trade which increases your problem. Do you recall any public statements being made by Secretary of State Baker indicating the high priority that we give to this drug problem publicly?

Secretary DUNCAN. Well, with due respect, the person I deal with at State is the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters, and I deal with him daily. I don't follow what the Secretary of State says. I do follow what Secretary Cheney, my boss, says. But Secretary Levitsky, over at the State Department, is very aggressively involved in this; we work very closely.

Mr. RANGEL. He is one of the most outstanding public servants that I know. You understand what I am trying to do, to raise the level of attention nationally that this problem is getting. Very few people know who Secretary Levitsky is.

Secretary DUNCAN. I wouldn't concede by my not knowing exactly what Secretary Baker said recently about it, that he hasn't said something about it. I just don't follow that. I do follow what my Secretary says and the President says. And I work daily with Mr. Levitsky. And, as far as I am concerned, we have a very good relationship and they have a very aggressive program.

Mr. RANGEL. When we had the Persian Gulf crisis I am certain that you followed what your boss was saying, as well as what Secretary Baker was saying. That's the nature of the mission and it just seems to me that you would be following what our foreign policy is, since so many of the people in your jurisdiction are working in foreign territories.

I don't believe what you just said, you do follow attentively what Secretary Baker is saying on—

Secretary DUNCAN. We follow the foreign policies of the United States. I don't follow on a daily basis the comments of Secretary Baker.

Mr. RANGEL. Oh, I'm not talking about it on a daily basis, I am talking about this year, or last year, since you were appointed by President Reagan, and I will even take you back to Secretary Shultz. You know, I don't care how far back you go, I am trying to compliment DOD on doing an outstanding job and we know what you are doing. I can't think of any agency or department that would be working more closely with the State Department than DOD.

I miss a lot of what is going on, on a daily basis. I am not over there at the White House. I just thought you might share with me whether or not the Secretary of State has been as outspoken as your boss on this issue?

Secretary DUNCAN. I do not attend cabinet meetings, sir. And I only—

Mr. RANGEL. I said public statements. I mean, you didn't have to be in a cabinet meeting to know Secretary Baker's position about Saddam Hussein.

Secretary DUNCAN. I am not trying to be evasive, but I will tell you my own perception is the State Department has an aggressive program and we are working very closely with them.

Mr. RANGEL. OK, so you have the same problem I do, we don't recall the Secretary of State saying anything about this subject.

Secretary DUNCAN. If you asked me what Secretary Cheney said——

Mr. RANGEL. I understand.

Secretary DUNCAN. If you asked me what Secretary Cheney said I would have to go back and——

Mr. RANGEL. If you asked me what Foley has said, I would take a look at that, too.

Listen, I did not mean for this to end on a less serious note than it began. DOD has a lot of respect around the world. And when you set out to do a job, you know that the integrity of those young men and women are on the line. You jealously protect their integrity, you do a good job inside the military, as well as representing us on the outside.

I take favorably your responses about staying out of civilian law enforcement because you have constitutional restrictions, that you have respected, and staying out of internal problems that foreign countries have, which is a very sensitive thing. You have done quite well in avoiding embarrassment for the United States of America, where you did have to work as partners with some of our allies that have less than our standards of human rights.

I think you have testified that you are not having any present legislative problems with the Congress, most all of your requests are being reasonably met. I want you to feel comfortable in contacting this committee, if we can be of any help to you.

Secretary DUNCAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you for your patience, and our best to the Secretary.

Secretary DUNCAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. And Secretary Baker, if you hear from him, as well.

Our next panel we have talked a lot about, Rear Admiral Leahy, Jr., Chief of the Law Enforcement and Defense Operation of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Honorable Thomas McDermott, Director of the Office of Domestic Operations, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Customs Service.

These two agencies have sometimes been referred to as the "Congressional Pets," but that is only because you have earned the admiration and respect of the U.S. Congress.

We appreciate what you are doing. Your testimony has been received by the committee, studied by the staff and its members, and without objection, will be entered in its entirety into our record.

You may proceed in the manner that you feel most comfortable. And we will start with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM P. LEAHY, JR., CHIEF,
OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS,
U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. THOMAS McDER-
MOTT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS, OFFICE
OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

Admiral LEAHY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

I have, as you indicated, a statement for the record. I would like to make a 2- or 3-minute summarization of that statement, if I may.

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection.

Admiral LEAHY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to provide an analysis of current drug trafficking trends and to discuss the impact of the Coast Guard's drug interdiction program, particularly in the eastern Caribbean.

By keeping the pressure on, we have repeatedly forced smugglers to change modes and routes to avoid the risk of seizure. Today it is apparent that the smugglers are using multimodal methods of shipping drugs, mixing it, for example, with legitimate cargo. Some of this occurs on commercial vessels without the knowledge of the master or crew.

Of the drug shipments we know of, the Atlantic region and specifically, the eastern Caribbean, is second only to the Central America-Mexico corridor in terms of volume. This area is ideal for the smugglers who use the unobserved islands and remote coastlines to cover their movements and hide contraband.

In the case of airdrops, it is a relatively short flight back to South America from the islands—compared to the United States, or the Bahamas—making nonstop flights practical and interdiction of the delivery aircraft very difficult.

Puerto Rico is especially attractive to smugglers who export their contraband to the United States. As a major port of entry, the opportunity to mix contraband into legitimate cargo, especially in hard-to-inspect containers and cruise ships, means more effort will be required to thwart this initiative.

Turning now to the subject of available resources, let me say that the Coast Guard maintains a significant Caribbean presence in the form of cutters, aircraft, shore units, and law enforcement detachments working from Navy ships. Our Greater Antilles section, GANTSEC, which is headquartered in San Juan, Puerto Rico, has seven patrol boats in Puerto Rico and Saint Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, which are deployed throughout the Antilles Islands.

Larger cutters from throughout the Atlantic area are deployed near Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to conduct boarding operations. Navy ships with Coast Guard law enforcement detachments [LEDETS], under the operational control of Joint Task Force 4 [JIF-4] in Key West, frequently transit the area.

With regard to aviation resources, we have a large air station at Borinquen, on the west side of Puerto Rico, where four HH65 shipboard-capable helicopters and three long-range C-130 surveillance aircraft are permanently based. Aircraft from other stations, including E-2C AEW aircraft and HU-25 interceptors, are constantly staging in this area to participate in air interdiction operations.

The Department of Defense has added numerous resources to the equation, including AWACS aircraft, which have proven very helpful. Cooperation between JTF-4 and these resources, as well as between aircraft and cutters working in the GANTSEC area has been excellent.

Intelligence collection, analysis and distribution are important parts of the drug interdiction process. Intelligence allows resources to be deployed to the correct location at the best time to effect an interdiction. We have made significant progress in this area. A GAO study, conducted in August 1990, found that, of the Coast Guard seizures sampled, use of intelligence was involved in 90 percent of the drugs seized. In the post-Desert Storm period, we look forward to an increased focus of national intelligence assets on drug interdiction. There are opportunities for more improvement in this area. The Coast Guard is represented on numerous committees and working groups to improve data access, interoperability, and rapid sharing of intelligence.

With regard to what is on the horizon, let me say that our fiscal year 1992 budget request again earmarks more resources for drug law enforcement than any other program, about 25 percent of our operating budget, and it is designed to maintain the effectiveness of the current air and maritime interdiction programs. The Coast Guard intends to continue managing our resource utilization to ensure that the best possible return is received for our interdiction investment.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of Coast Guard interdiction efforts, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Leahy follows:]

U.S. Department
of Transportation
United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard

Washington, DC 20593
Staff Symbol
Phone

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

U.S. COAST GUARD

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM P. LEAHY JR., USCG

CHIEF, OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS

ON FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS

BEFORE THE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 20, 1991

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM P. LEAHY, JR.
CHIEF, OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

Rear Admiral William P. Leahy, Jr. became Chief, Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations, United States Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, DC in June 1991. As such, Admiral Leahy is responsible to the Commandant for establishing the program requirements for surface and aviation operations.

Prior to this assignment, Admiral Leahy was Commander Joint Task Force Five, located in Alameda, California. This command's mission is to conduct operations to detect and monitor aircraft and surface vessels suspected of smuggling illegal drugs within the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility.

Rear Admiral Leahy has served aboard many vessels during his career including Coast Guard cutters MCCULLOCH, DUANE, CASTLE ROCK, RESOLUTE, SHERMAN, DALLAS, and COMANCHE. He served as Commanding Officer of cutters DECISIVE and GALLATIN.

His shore assignment include: Commanding Officer of the Long Range Aids to Navigation (LORAN) Station on Marcus Island; Commander, Coast Guard Group Buffalo, New York; Office of Search and Rescue, Washington, DC; Readiness Branch, Coast Guard Atlantic Area; and Commanding Officer of Vessel Traffic Service New York. Rear Admiral Leahy served two tours in Vietnam - first as Division Commander Division 13 in 1970, and later as Senior Coast Guard Officer in 1972. He also served as Chief, Operations Division, and Chief of Staff, Twelfth Coast Guard District in Alameda, California, and as Chief of Staff, Coast Guard Pacific Area Command located at Coast Guard Island.

Rear Admiral Leahy's awards include: Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with Gold Star, Bronze Star medal with combat "V" device, the Meritorious Service Medal with "O" device and Gold Star, the Coast Guard Commendation Medal, the U.S. Navy Commendation Medal with combat "V" device, the Combat Action Ribbon, and the Vietnam Service medal with four Bronze Stars. Rear Admiral Leahy is also authorized to wear the Cutterman Insignia.

Rear Admiral Leahy was born and raised in Worcester, Massachusetts. Upon graduation from Classical High School, he entered the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut and graduated in 1959.

Rear Admiral Leahy is married to the former Margaret P. Peirce of Stratham, New Hampshire. They have three children: Sarah, Mark and Matthew.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
U.S. COAST GUARD
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM P. LEAHY JR., USCG
CHIEF, OFFICE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS
ON FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 20, 1991

GOOD MORNING MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE. IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DRUG TRAFFICKING TRENDS AND TO DISCUSS THE IMPACT OF THE COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION PROGRAM, PARTICULARLY IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN.

I WOULD NOTE THAT DUE TO THE UNCLASSIFIED NATURE OF THE HEARING, SOME OF THE SPECIFICS OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES COMMITTED AND PLANS MUST BE OMITTED. ADDITIONALLY, THE COAST GUARD MUST BE CAREFUL TO PROTECT THE SOURCES OF SOME OF ITS INTELLIGENCE IN THESE MATTERS.

THE COAST GUARD CONSIDERS COCAINE SMUGGLING AS THE PRIMARY DRUG THREAT IN THE AREA. WHILE SOME MARIJUANA SEIZURES ARE STILL TAKING PLACE, MARIJUANA SMUGGLING HAS DECLINED DRAMATICALLY AS A RESULT OF A SUCCESSFUL INTERDICTION PROGRAM AND REDUCED DEMAND. HOWEVER, WE HAVE SEEN SIGNS OF RENEWED PRODUCTION ACTIVITY IN THE CARIBBEAN WHICH WE WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR. THE COAST GUARD HAS NO DATA TO INDICATE THAT A THREAT OF HEROIN SMUGGLING EXISTS IN THE MARITIME REGION.

BY KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY FORCED SMUGGLERS TO CHANGE MODES AND ROUTES TO AVOID THE RISK OF SEIZURE. AS TRADITIONAL MARITIME SMUGGLING USING LARGE MOTHERSHIPS HAS DECREASED, AIRDROPS TO WAITING FAST BOATS HAS PICKED UP. THE SUCCESS OF INTERDICTION OPERATIONS IN THE BAHAMAS AND TURKS AND CAICOS (OPBAT) GREATLY REDUCED SMUGGLING IN THAT REGION. RECENTLY, WE HAVE WITNESSED FURTHER EXPERIMENTATION WITH NEW MODES AND ROUTES.

IT IS APPARENT THAT THE SMUGGLERS ARE USING MULTI-MODAL METHODS OF SHIPPING DRUGS; MIXING IT, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH LEGITIMATE CARGO. IT CAN TAKE DAYS TO FERRET OUT SMALL AMOUNTS OF COCAINE BEING MOVED IN BULK CARGOS SUCH AS CEMENT. THE USE OF UNDERWATER APPENDAGES ON THE HULL OF SHIPS IS ANOTHER RECENT INNOVATION. SOME OF THIS OCCURS ON COMMERCIAL VESSELS WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MASTER OR CREW.

OF THE DRUG SHIPMENTS WE KNOW OF, SOMEWHAT GREATER AMOUNTS MAY BE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES VIA THE SOUTHWEST BORDER THAN THROUGH MARITIME ROUTES. HOWEVER, SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF DRUGS ARE STILL SMUGGLED IN BOTH THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC REGIONS. IN THE PACIFIC, AIR CORRIDORS ARE USED TO SMUGGLE DRUGS INTO SOUTHERN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA FOR FURTHER SHIPMENT OVER LAND. WE RECEIVE PERIODIC REPORTS OF MARITIME SHIPMENTS UP THE PACIFIC COAST AS WELL. DURING A DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATION LAST FALL, THE CREW OF MOTOR VESSEL NORDCAPP SCUTTLED THEIR VESSEL WITH A REPORTED 15 METRIC TONS OF COCAINE ON BOARD. BUT, THE ATLANTIC REGION, AND SPECIFICALLY THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, IS SECOND ONLY TO THE CENTRAL AMERICA/MEXICO CORRIDOR IN TERMS OF VOLUME.

THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN IS A NATURAL CROSSROADS FOR BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE. SMUGGLING AND PIRACY IN THESE ISLAND AREAS DATE BACK TO THE DAYS OF EUROPEAN COLONIZATION IN THE AMERICAS. TODAY, THESE AREAS ARE STILL ACTIVE AND ARE KEEPING THE COAST GUARD BUSY, WITH BOTH TRADITIONAL MARITIME SMUGGLING BY VESSELS, AND AIR DROPS OF NARCOTICS TO WAITING VESSELS. THIS AREA IS IDEAL FOR THE SMUGGLERS WHO USE THE UNOBSERVED ISLANDS AND REMOTE COASTLINES TO COVER THEIR MOVEMENTS AND HIDE CONTRABAND. SMUGGLERS USE THE TERRITORIAL SEAS OF OTHER NATIONS AND AIRSPACE OF SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO SHIELD OR COVER THEIR MOVEMENTS, AND TO PREVENT OUR INTERDICTION FORCES FROM REACHING THEM. IN THE CASE OF AIRDROPS, IT IS A RELATIVELY SHORT FLIGHT BACK TO SOUTH AMERICA

FROM THE ISLANDS COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES OR THE BAHAMAS, MAKING NON-STOP FLIGHTS PRACTICAL, AND INTERDICTION OF THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT VERY DIFFICULT.

PUERTO RICO IS ESPECIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO SMUGGLERS WHO EXPORT THEIR CONTRABAND TO THE UNITED STATES. AS A MAJOR PORT OF ENTRY, THE OPPORTUNITY TO MIX CONTRABAND INTO LEGITIMATE CARGO, ESPECIALLY IN HARD-TO-INSPECT CONTAINERS AND CRUISE SHIPS, MEANS MORE EFFORT WILL BE REQUIRED TO THWART THIS INITIATIVE.

TWO STRATEGIC CHOKEPOINTS, THE MONA AND ANEGADA PASSES, ARE LOCATED ON EITHER SIDE OF PUERTO RICO. OUR NEARLY-CONTINUOUS PRESENCE IN THE FORM OF SEA-BASED AEROSTATS, AIRCRAFT, MAJOR CUTTERS AND PATROL BOATS HAS CAUSED MARIJUANA SMUGGLING ACTIVITY THROUGH THE CHOKEPOINTS TO DIMINISH GREATLY. COCAINE, WELL-SECRETED IN HIDDEN COMPARTMENTS, IS STILL A PROBLEM, BUT MOST SMUGGLERS ARE AVOIDING THE MONA AND ANEGADA PASSES. THERE WERE FOUR VESSEL SEIZURES IN THIS AREA IN MARCH THROUGH MAY OF THIS YEAR: THREE WERE FOREIGN, AND ONE U.S.-FLAGGED. THE DANIELA I, OF COLOMBIA WAS THE LARGEST SEIZURE, WITH 2,422 POUNDS OF COCAINE. THE ANTIPODES III OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS SEIZED WITH 462 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, SHOWING THAT WHILE MARIJUANA SMUGGLING HAS DECLINED IN IMPORTANCE, IT IS STILL BEING SMUGGLED.

I WOULD BE REMISS IN NOT MENTIONING THAT THE CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF MANY OF THE NATIONS IN THE AREA, SUCH AS HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HAVE ADDED SEVERE ECONOMIC REFUGEE PROBLEMS TO THE LIST OF MISSIONS FOR OUR CUTTERS. THE MOVEMENT OF CUBAN POLITICAL/ECONOMIC MIGRANTS HAS ALSO SHOWN A DRAMATIC RISE IN THE PAST YEAR. GIVEN THE DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, I DO NOT SEE AN END TO THIS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DRUG SMUGGLERS CAN USE PERIODS OF UNREST TO DIVERT ATTENTION AWAY FROM THEIR ACTIVITIES.

TURNING NOW TO THE SUBJECT OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES, LET ME SAY THAT THE COAST GUARD MAINTAINS A SIGNIFICANT CARIBBEAN PRESENCE IN THE FORM OF CUTTERS.

AIRCRAFT, SHORE UNITS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS (LEDETS) WORKING FROM NAVY SHIPS. OUR SEVENTH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, LOCATED IN MIAMI, HAS OVERALL OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF COAST GUARD CUTTERS PATROLLING THESE WATERS. TACTICAL CONTROL, IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN, IS NORMALLY DELEGATED TO THE COAST GUARD'S GREATER ANTILLES SECTION (GANTSEC), WHICH IS HEADQUARTERED IN SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. GANTSEC HAS SEVEN PATROL BOATS IN PUERTO RICO AND ST. THOMAS, U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS, WHICH ARE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE ANTILLES ISLANDS TO DETER SMUGGLING AND ENFORCE ALL APPLICABLE LAWS. GANTSEC MAINTAINS SUPPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES FOR COAST GUARD FORCES IN THE AREA, AND KEEPS CLOSE TIES TO ALL THE FEDERAL, LOCAL, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT GROUPS IN THE AREA.

LARGER CUTTERS FROM THROUGHOUT THE ATLANTIC AREA ARE DEPLOYED NEAR PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS TO CONDUCT DOD COORDINATED OPERATIONS. NAVY SHIPS WITH COAST GUARD LEDETS, UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF JOINT TASK FORCE FOUR (JTF4) IN KEY WEST, FREQUENTLY TRANSIT THE AREA. JTF4 AND THE COAST GUARD SEVENTH DISTRICT WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO ENSURE THE OPERATIONS CENTER AT GANTSEC IN SAN JUAN HAS THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

SHIPRIDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS HAVE PROVED TO BE VERY SUCCESSFUL IN BUILDING TRUST AND COOPERATION. THESE AGREEMENTS ALLOW OUR CUTTERS TO PATROL WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL SEAS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY AS LONG AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS ABOARD. THIS GREATLY INCREASES THE AREA WE CAN COVER, AND EFFECTIVELY DENIES THE SMUGGLER SANCTUARY IN FOREIGN WATERS. WE SUPPORT DEPARTMENT OF STATE EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRENCH, DUTCH AND OTHER EASTERN CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.

WITH REGARD TO AVIATION RESOURCES, WE HAVE A LARGE AIR STATION AT BORINQUEN, ON THE WEST SIDE OF PUERTO RICO, WHERE FOUR HH65 SHIPBOARD-CAPABLE HELICOPTERS AND THREE LONG-RANGE C-130 SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT ARE PERMANENTLY

BASED. THESE C-130 AIRCRAFT HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FITTED WITH THE APS-137 SURFACE SEARCH RADAR WHICH HAS GREATLY EXPANDED THEIR CAPABILITY TO ASSIST IN DETECTION OF SURFACE TARGETS. AIRCRAFT FROM OTHER AIR STATIONS, INCLUDING E-2C AEW AIRCRAFT AND HU-25 INTERCEPTORS, ARE CONSTANTLY STAGING IN THIS AREA TO PARTICIPATE IN AIR INTERDICTION OPERATIONS, CONDUCTED UNDER THE TACTICAL CONTROL OF C3I EAST OPERATIONS CENTER IN MIAMI. THESE AIRCRAFT COMPLEMENT THE SURFACE EFFORT, AND THE E-2C, IN PARTICULAR, PROVIDES A DETAILED PRESENTATION OF THE SURFACE PICTURE TO LINK EQUIPPED SHIPS IN THE AREA. THIS CAPABILITY HAS HELPED ALLEVIATE THE CONFUSION SURROUNDING MOST AIRDROPS IN THAT MULTIPLE FIXED AND ROTARY WING LAW ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT CAN BE VECTORED TO THE SMUGGLING AIRCRAFT, AND VESSELS, AND VARIOUS POLICE UNITS, CUTTERS AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES CAN BE DIRECTED TO THE SCENE TO EFFECT APPREHENSION. CURRENTLY, U.S. AUTHORITIES HAVE NO LEGAL MEANS TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE TO LAND. HOWEVER, ON JUNE 18, THE ADMINISTRATION TRANSMITTED THE "DRUG SUPPLY REDUCTION ACT OF 1991," WHICH PROPOSES SUMMARY REVOCATION OF PILOTS CERTIFICATES AND AIRCRAFT OWNERS' REGISTRATIONS, AND WILL PROVIDE FOR A CRIMINAL PENALTY FOR THOSE AIRCRAFT THAT FAIL TO OBEY AN ORDER TO LAND. THE COAST GUARD SUPPORTS THESE EFFORTS.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) HAS ADDED NUMEROUS RESOURCES TO THE EQUATION, INCLUDING AWACS AIRCRAFT, WHICH HAVE PROVED VERY HELPFUL. COORDINATION BETWEEN JTF4 AND THESE RESOURCES, AS WELL AS BETWEEN AIRCRAFT AND CUTTERS WORKING IN THE GANTSEC AREA, HAS BEEN EXCELLENT. SURFACE DETECTION AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING NAVY P-3C'S AND MARINE CORPS OV-10 BRONCOS, HAVE ALSO BEEN UTILIZED TO GOOD EFFECT. IN THE AFTERMATH OF OPERATION DESERT STORM, WE LOOK FORWARD TO DOD RESOURCES REFOCUSING THEIR EFFORTS ON DETECTION AND MONITORING, SO THAT OPTIMAL CUEING FOR OUR TACTICAL ASSETS CAN TAKE PLACE.

THE AIR INTERDICTION "PROBLEM" SPANS A MUCH GREATER THEATER THAN JUST PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS. THERE ARE ENFORCEMENT SUCCESSES IN THE NORTHERN CARIBBEAN AND BAHAMAS THAT MAY HAVE IMPACTS ON PUERTO RICO. THE OPBAT SITE AT GREAT INAGUA, BAHAMAS, IS NOW OPEN, AND THE COAST GUARD IS ACQUIRING THE HH-60J JAYHAWKS WHICH WILL PUSH THE AIR SMUGGLER FURTHER FROM THE SOUTHERN BAHAMAS. THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT WITH THE BAHAMAS AND TURKS AND CAICOS, IN WHICH THE POLICE OF THESE NATIONS WORK AND RIDE WITH THE U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (DEA) IN COAST GUARD HELICOPTERS, HAS BEEN A MODEL PROGRAM. WHILE OUR INCREASED PRESENCE IN THE NORTHERN BAHAMAS MAY PUSH THE PROBLEM SOUTH, THE CURRENT OPBAT RESOURCES ARE VERY TRANSPORTABLE; IN FACT, WE HAVE USED THEM SUCCESSFULLY DURING OPERATION VIPER IN PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS IN 1990.

TWO OF THE THREE PLANNED LAND BASED AEROSTATS IN THE BAHAMAS ARE OPERATING: "CARIBAL I" AT HIGH ROCK (FREEPORT), AND "CARIBAL II" AT GEORGETOWN. THE THIRD AEROSTAT AT GREAT INAGUA SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL IN JUNE, 1992. ADDITIONALLY, THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO IS PLANNING TO CONSTRUCT AN AEROSTAT. WHILE NOT A COAST GUARD PROJECT, THIS ASSET SHOULD CERTAINLY HELP IN DETECTING SMUGGLERS THAT FLY WITHIN ITS AREA OF COVERAGE.

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS, AND DISTRIBUTION ARE IMPORTANT PARTS OF THE DRUG INTERDICTION PROCESS. THE BENEFIT OF INTELLIGENCE CAN BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY. INTELLIGENCE ALLOWS RESOURCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE CORRECT LOCATION AT THE BEST TIME TO EFFECT AN INTERDICTION. WE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THIS AREA. A GAO STUDY, CONDUCTED IN AUGUST 1990, FOUND THAT, OF THE COAST GUARD SEIZURES SAMPLED, USE OF INTELLIGENCE WAS INVOLVED IN 90 PERCENT OF THE DRUGS SEIZED. THIS IS A RESULT OF COOPERATION AMONG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS AND OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS. IN THE POST-DESERT

STORM PERIOD, WE LOOK FORWARD TO AN INCREASED FOCUS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ASSETS ON DRUG INTERDICTION. THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE IMPROVEMENT IN THIS AREA. THE COAST GUARD PARTICIPATES ON NUMEROUS COMMITTEES AND WORKING GROUPS TO IMPROVE DATA ACCESS, INTER-OPERABILITY AND RAPID SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE. AS THE WORKING RELATIONS OF OUR VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS MATURE, THE QUANTITY AND TIMELINESS OF ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED BY OUR OPERATING UNITS WILL ENABLE THEM TO BE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE.

WITH REGARD TO WHAT IS ON THE HORIZON, LET ME SAY THAT OUR FISCAL YEAR 1992 BUDGET REQUEST AGAIN EARMARKS MORE RESOURCES FOR DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT THAN ANY OTHER PROGRAM, ABOUT 25 PERCENT OF OUR OPERATING BUDGET, AND IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT AIR AND MARITIME INTERDICTION PROGRAMS. IN ADDITION, OUR FY-92 BUDGET REQUEST WILL CONTINUE ONGOING MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS FOR HIGH ENDURANCE CUTTERS AND 210' MEDIUM ENDURANCE CUTTERS, AND UPGRADE THE COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) SYSTEMS OF THESE VESSELS. IT WILL CONTINUE THE MH-60J HELICOPTER PROCUREMENTS FOR THE OPBAT PROGRAM. THE C3 SYSTEMS WILL IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF TACTICAL LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION PROVIDED TO FIELD UNITS AND WILL ALSO IMPROVE THE COAST GUARD'S ABILITY TO INTERCEPT, TRACK, AND APPREHEND SMUGGLERS. ADDITIONALLY, OUR FY-92 BUDGET PROVIDES FOR OPERATING NEW LAND-BASED AEROSTATS LOCATED AT GREAT INAGUA, BAHAMAS, VENICE, FLORIDA, AND MATAGORDA, TEXAS. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS REQUESTED IN THIS BUDGET, WILL FOCUS ON TECHNOLOGIES TO MAKE EXISTING OPERATING UNITS MORE CAPABLE. THE COAST GUARD INTENDS TO CONTINUE MANAGING OUR RESOURCES UTILIZATION TO ENSURE THAT THE BEST POSSIBLE RETURN IS RECEIVED FOR OUR INTERDICTION INVESTMENT.

THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF COAST GUARD DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Admiral.

If there is no objection, we will hear from Mr. McDermott, the director of the Office of Domestic Operations from U.S. Customs, and then we will question the panel.

Mr. McDermott.

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS A. McDERMOTT

Mr. McDERMOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am here today on behalf of Carol Hallett, the Commissioner of Customs, to explain the Customs role in the interdiction and the war on drugs.

The first time I had the pleasure of addressing this committee was about 1 year ago, when I came up to give a briefing on the Douglas Tunnel that Customs had shut down. I think the tunnel is a fine example, and a good place to start, on where we think we are headed in our interdiction effort.

First of all, what we knew all along is that the drug smugglers had the money to put together an operation such as a tunnel. But the ability was an eye opener for us, and the extent in which they used to cross the border was another eye opener, knowing now that they will stop at nothing to beat us in crossing the border.

The other thing that it was an illustration of is that, in fact, the interdiction efforts are working. That it is not such a piece of cake to cross the border, although our interdiction efforts are not fool-proof, I don't think they would have gone to these extents to enter the country with their drugs.

One of the things that took place in March of 1990 was an agreement with the Drug Enforcement Administration that was entered into by the Commissioner of Customs, to cross designate Customs agents to conduct title XXI drug enforcement investigations beyond the border context. And, basically, that has been a tremendous success. It has enabled us to bridge the gap that existed between interdiction effort and investigations, allowing us to take over cases that Customs initiated, both post- and pre-interdiction investigations, and take them beyond the individuals responsible for moving the drugs across the border, and moving rapidly into the next several levels of violators throughout the country.

We have been extremely successful. I think it has been a great effort of enhancing existing drug resources, with really no cost to the taxpayers; just shifting of responsibility, enabling the Drug Enforcement Administration to concentrate on a much higher level violator.

The other accomplishment, I think, that we have had this last couple of years is in the coordination effort. You have heard much talk today about the coordination with DOD and I think I would agree with Secretary Duncan, we have made tremendous strides. Just 2 years ago we weren't in the shape we are today and I can see that effort continuing.

We are also getting much better at our coordinating effort between the law enforcement agencies. One of the examples is the Drug Enforcement Administration. There was a strained relationship for some 15 to 17 years between the two agencies. This cross designation, this agreement, was able to pull the agencies together,

working closer. We are working closer than I have ever seen before with many State and local agencies, particularly those along our borders that do have drugs actually crossing their communities.

One of our other strategies was to beef up the inspections at the ports of entry through a more intelligent process. In other words, not just random examinations, but focusing our examinations on good potential targets. We are doing it—we have to do a sorting process at that particular point, and that not only pertains to people entering the country, but the conveyances, the airplanes, the boats, as well as the millions of tons of cargo that enter the United States on an annual basis.

We have employed the use of the National Guard in many of the States to help us. And we have increased our ability to search more cargo containers. Although that figure may seem small, by doing manifest reviews and looking at cargo and using selective criteria, we are, in fact, doing a more intelligent job in our selection of cargo coming into the United States.

As far as the Department of Defense, again, I agree that the Department of Defense is involved in the detection and monitoring, and we have several levels—many, many levels of coordination. The policy level of coordination between the various agencies and the Department of Defense is the Border Interdiction Committee, which is a committee that is chaired by Commissioner Hallett and cochaired by Secretary Duncan, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

Our interdiction effort, I think, has been a tremendous success and although we haven't completely eliminated air penetrations across our border, I think we have increased the risks to such a degree that we have deterred and forced much of the smuggling to the ground. The aerostat program has been a success. We have seen the smugglers landing short of the aerostat in Mexico and other locations. And then working with the foreign governments throughout Central and South America, we are putting a strain on these smuggling operations and pushing them to much riskier areas to bring their loads into the United States.

The marine aspects, we are working very closely with the Coast Guard. We are now faced with airdrops off the Caribbean, airdrops that are dropped off and in a quick turnaround the plane is headed back to Colombia and other countries. That involves us putting together our air resources, along with our marine resources, using the military to detect and monitor these targets, as well as the Coast Guard in the apprehension, search, and seizure of these targets.

The bottom line, I think, is we have forced the smuggling organizations into a pattern where they are a lot more vulnerable.

Another statement I will agree with is we estimate that our interdiction efforts—information, intelligence-driven interdiction—is about 80 percent of what we do now. We are not just doing the cold type of searches on the border with little or no information. We are focusing our attention on this particular area.

Now that we have these organizations vulnerable, we have employed many undercover operations throughout the country, where we have come in and actually taken advantage of their vulnerability and supplied them with the means and opportunity to bring

their drugs in, at which time their drugs are seized and the organizations are arrested.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The statement of Mr. McDermott follows:]

STATEMENT OF

THOMAS A. MCDERMOTT

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

ON

JUNE 20, 1991

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM HERE TODAY ON BEHALF OF COMMISSIONER HALLETT TO DISCUSS CUSTOM'S ROLE AS THE LEAD AGENCY IN DRUG INTERDICTION, AND THE IMPACT WE ARE HAVING IN THE WAR ON DRUGS.

I FIRST HAD THE OPPORTUNITY LAST YEAR TO BRIEF THE CHAIRMAN AND THIS COMMITTEE IN CLOSED SESSION, AT WHICH TIME I DISCUSSED THE DRUG TUNNEL CUSTOMS SHUT DOWN IN DOUGLAS, ARIZONA. PERHAPS THAT TUNNEL IS AN APPROPRIATE STARTING POINT FOR MY TESTIMONY TODAY.

THE DOUGLAS TUNNEL WAS UNIQUE AND SOMETHING LAW ENFORCEMENT HAS NEVER SEEN BEFORE. IT ILLUSTRATED A VERY IMPORTANT TENET KNOWN TO THOSE OF US WHO HAVE WORKED THE FRONT LINES OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ON THE BORDER -- AND THAT IS: THE DRUG LORDS WILL TRY ANY METHOD, USE ANY AREA AND PAY ANY PRICE TO GET THEIR DRUGS INTO THE U.S. MARKET.

THE WHOLE THING IS A DEADLY GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE.

IT CHALLENGES EVEN THE MOST SEASONED AGENTS AND INSPECTORS, AND IT GOES ON EVERY DAY.

WE GOT THE TUNNEL BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN ADAPTING OUR INTERDICTION TECHNIQUES TO FIT WITH THE NEW MODES OF SMUGGLING WE ARE ENCOUNTERING--BOTH THROUGH INVESTIGATIVE DRIVEN INTERDICTIONS AND SELECTIVE TARGETING OF PASSENGERS AND CARGO.

IN MARCH 1990, DEA AGREED TO CROSS-DESIGNATE 1,000 CUSTOMS SPECIAL AGENTS WITH TITLE 21 AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT RELATED TO NARCOTICS SMUGGLING AND DRUG MONEY LAUNDERING. THESE 1,000 AGENTS JOINED APPROXIMATELY 200 CUSTOMS AGENTS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN GIVEN LIMITED CROSS-DESIGNATION. CROSS-DESIGNATED CUSTOMS AGENTS NOW TAKE INTERDICTION INVESTIGATIONS FROM THEIR INCEPTION, THROUGH ACTUAL INTERDICTION AT THE BORDER, ON TO INDEPTH FOLLOW-UP CONSPIRACY

INVESTIGATIONS WITHOUT ANY LOSS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONSISTENCY.

WITH THIS EXPANDED TITLE 21 AUTHORITY CUSTOMS HAS BEEN ABLE TO BRIDGE THE GAP THAT HAS EXISTED FOR THE LAST 15 YEARS BETWEEN NARCOTICS INTERDICTION AND INVESTIGATION AT OUR BORDERS. OUR IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TO AND INVESTIGATION OF SMUGGLING ATTEMPTS HAS LED TO THE APPREHENSION OF FACILITATORS, BROKERS AND OTHER CO-CONSPIRATORS OF A HIGHER ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL THAN SIMPLY THE DRIVER OF A LOADED VEHICLE OR BACK-PACKER OF NARCOTICS. AS CUSTOMS HAS NOW ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR BOTH PRE- AND POST-INTERDICTION INVESTIGATIONS, THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ABLE TO CONCENTRATE ON THEIR NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMS. THE NET EFFECT HAS BEEN A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE FEDERAL EFFORT.

OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT AN EFFECTIVE USE OF FEDERAL INTERDICTION RESOURCES IS ENHANCED BY JOINT EFFORTS WITH OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. ACCORDINGLY, CUSTOMS HAS UNDERTAKEN SEVERAL ON-GOING JOINT INITIATIVES WITH STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. THE BLUE LIGHTNING STRIKE FORCE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES, INITIATED IN EARLY 1985, AND OPERATION ALLIANCE FOR THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, ARE PROVING THAT SUCCESSFUL RESULTS CAN BE OBTAINED FROM A COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT EFFORT.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT JOINT EFFORT INVOLVES BORDER INSPECTIONS. OPERATION GUARDIAN HAS PROVEN ESPECIALLY SUCCESSFUL ALONG THE SOUTHWEST BORDER AND IN SOUTH FLORIDA. IN THIS PROGRAM, THE NATIONAL GUARD IS TRAINED IN THE PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF CARGO, PARTICULARLY CONTAINERS. THE GUARD HAS PARTICIPATED DIRECTLY IN THE SEIZURE OF OVER 7,900 POUNDS OF COCAINE,

6,800 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, 15 POUNDS OF HEROIN, AND OVER \$232,000 IN MERCHANDISE.

AS YOU KNOW OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, DOD HAS INCREASED THEIR EFFORTS IN THE MONITORING AND DETECTION AREAS OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS SMUGGLING ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS. THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR INTERDICTION EFFORTS HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL.

FROM A POLICY LEVEL, CUSTOMS INTERACTS WITH DOD THROUGH THE BORDER INTERDICTION COMMITTEE (BIC).

THE BORDER INTERDICTION COMMITTEE IS A SUB-ELEMENT OF THE SUPPLY REDUCTION WORKING GROUP (SRWG) OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY. IT IS PERMANENTLY CHAIRED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, WITH THE COMMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD AND THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT PLANS AND SUPPORT, SERVING AS PERMANENT DEPUTY CHAIRMEN. OUR INTERDICTION AND INVESTIGATIVE

EFFORTS HAVE MOVED CUSTOMS TO THE FOREFRONT OF FEDERAL NARCOTICS REMOVALS. DURING FY-90 CUSTOMS SEIZED OVER 164,000 POUNDS OF COCAINE, 17,000 POUNDS OF HASHISH, 1,500 POUNDS OF HEROIN, AND OVER 220,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA TO LEAD ALL FEDERAL AGENCIES.

ADDITIONALLY, WE COORDINATE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES WITH DOD AND OTHER AGENCIES THROUGH OUR OPERATION ALLIANCE ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER AND PROJECT NORTHSTAR ON THE NORTHERN BORDER OF THE UNITED STATES.

TURNING TO THE SOUTH FLORIDA AND CARIBBEAN AREA, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS AREA REMAINS EXTREMELY ACTIVE. AS YOU KNOW, AIR INTERDICTION IS AN INTEGRAL COMPONENT OF THE FEDERAL WAR ON DRUGS. IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY DISRUPT THE SMUGGLING AIR AND MARINE THREAT, CUSTOMS STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO ACQUIRE STATE-OF-THE-ART EQUIPMENT, CONFIGURED INTO INTERDICTION

MODULES THAT ARE CONTROLLED AND DIRECTED BY A CENTRALIZED COMMAND STRUCTURE WHICH WE CALL C3I.

AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY OPERATED BY CUSTOMS INCLUDE: JET INTERCEPTORS EQUIPPED WITH RADAR AND INFRARED DETECTION SENSORS, HIGH-PERFORMANCE HELICOPTERS, SINGLE AND MULTI-ENGINE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT, AND AIRBORNE DETECTION PLATFORMS. RADAR-EQUIPPED AEROSTATS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DETECTION AND TRACKING CAPABILITIES. THE CUSTOMS SERVICE HAS SEVEN NOMAD AIRCRAFT ENABLING CUSTOMS TO SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AT MARINE THREAT DETECTION.

TO FURTHER ENHANCE EFFECTIVENESS, COORDINATED CUSTOMS AIR AND MARINE UNITS ALSO SUPPORT STATE, LOCAL AND FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS IN THEIR LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES. IN FY 1990, THE AVIATION PROGRAM--IN CONJUNCTION WITH THOSE GOVERNMENTS--IN OPERATIONS RESULTING IN THE SEIZURE OF 101,809 POUNDS OF COCAINE

AND 1,559 ARRESTS. WHILE MANY OF THESE SEIZURES ARE NOT CREDITED DIRECTLY TO CUSTOMS, MOST WOULD NOT BE MADE WITHOUT CUSTOMS SERVICE ASSISTANCE.

COMPLIMENTARY TO AND INTERACTING WITH AIR OPERATIONS, THE CUSTOMS MARINE PROGRAM PROTECTS THE SEA APPROACHES OF THE NATION'S BORDERS. TO COUNTER SMUGGLING BY PLEASURE CRAFT AND FISHING VESSELS, CUSTOMS IS WORKING TO IMPROVE ITS DETECTION, SORTING, TRACKING AND APPREHENSION CAPABILITIES. MAJOR EMPHASIS IS ON THE SORTING OF HIGH-RISK TARGETS FROM LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC.

THE BLUE LIGHTNING OPERATIONS CENTER (BLOC) AT MIAMI IS NOW COLOCATED WITH THE C3I-EAST FACILITY. BLOC'S MAIN FUNCTIONS INCLUDE DETECTION, SECURE COMMUNICATIONS, AND ACCESS TO AN INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE AS WELL AS EXERCISING COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION OVER NUMEROUS FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL

LAW ENFORCEMENT AIR AND MARINE RESOURCES.

PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS CONTINUE AS ACTIVE AIRDROP AND OFF-LOAD AREAS. IN TERMS OF RISK FOR PROFIT, AIRDROPS ARE STILL THE PREFERRED METHOD OF PRIVATE AIR/MARINE SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS. IN FY 90 THERE WERE SOME 59 AIR DROP OPERATIONS DETECTED AND OBSERVED IN THIS AREA. WE CONTINUE TO ADDRESS THE CARIBBEAN SMUGGLING THREAT THROUGH INTERDICTION OPERATIONS SUPPORTED BY INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATIONS.

TO BOLSTER CARIBBEAN OPERATIONS THE VIRGIN ISLAND TRUST FUND HAS RECENTLY APPROVED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CUSTOMS AGENTS FROM THREE TO TEN. AN ADDITIONAL U.S. CUSTOMS INTERCEPTOR VESSEL HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND TWO ADDITIONAL INTERCEPTORS WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE VIRGIN ISLAND BLUE LIGHTNING STRIKE FORCE.

I CAN TELL YOU ALSO THAT CUSTOMS INVESTIGATIONS HAVE HAD GREAT SUCCESS WITH UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN. CURRENTLY THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, SOUTH FLORIDA AND THE SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, PUERTO RICO HAVE SEVERAL ONGOING OPERATIONS. THESE OPERATIONS HAVE PROVIDED CUSTOMS SPECIAL AGENTS A EFFECTIVE MEANS OF PENETRATING MAJOR DRUG SMUGGLING ORGANIZATIONS.

CURRENT TRENDS INDICATE THAT ONCE THE DRUGS HAVE MADE THEIR WAY INTO PUERTO RICO OR THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, TRAFFICKERS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ISLANDS INSULAR POSSESSION STATUS WITH THE UNITED STATES TO TRANSSHIP DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES. THE PRIMARY METHOD OF TRANSHIPMENT AT THIS TIME IS VIA AIRLINE AND CRUISE SHIP PASSENGERS.

OVERALL WE SEE MARINE SMUGGLING ACTIVITY INCREASING IN PUERTO RICO AND THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AS IT

HAS BEEN DISPLACED FROM THE BAHAMAS AND SOUTH FLORIDA. TO FURTHER COMBAT THIS THE CARIBBEAN OPERATION COMMAND AND INTELLIGENCE CENTER IN PUERTO RICO NOW INTEGRATES THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE FROM NUMEROUS AGENCIES TO RESPOND TO THE NARCOTICS THREAT. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CUSTOMS SPECIAL AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE VIRGIN ISLANDS. A SHIP-RIDER AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS IS ALSO BEING PURSUED IN AN EFFORT TO CROSS BRITISH TERRITORIAL WATERS FOR JOINT MARINE DRUG INTERDICTION MISSIONS. COCAINE HAS BECOME A BULK COMMODITY BOTH ON LAND AND SEA. SMUGGLING IN KILO QUANTITIES CONTINUES, BUT REPRESENTS A SHRINKING SHARE AS THE AVERAGE LOAD IS USUALLY BETWEEN 500 AND 2000 POUNDS.

SEA CONTAINERS AND SMALLER GENERAL CARGO SHIPS OPERATING IN THE CARIBBEAN WILL REPRESENT THE GREATEST PORTION OF THIS THREAT, WITH LAND BORDER

CONTAINERS ACCOUNTING FOR MOST OF THE BALANCE. COLOMBIA, FOLLOWED BY BOLIVIA, WILL SUPPLY THE BULK OF THE COCAINE TO THE MARKET PLACES IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE. DRUG TRAFFICKERS WILL CONTINUE TO USE TRANSIT COUNTRIES FOR DIRECT ENTRY USING COMMERCIAL CARGO AND CONTAINERS. ADDITIONALLY, HEROIN CONSUMPTION, WHICH HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT, WILL INCREASE. SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL BE THE PRIMARY SOURCE OF SUPPLY. SOUTHWEST ASIA AND MEXICO WILL BE SECONDARY SOURCES.

U.S. CUSTOMS IS FULLY COMMITTED TO THE ADMINISTRATIONS NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY AS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR AND INNOVATOR IN THE INTERDICTION EFFORT. TODAY, WE ARE BETTER ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED THAN IN THE PAST TO COMBAT THE DRUG THREAT TO OUR NATION, BY INCREASING PRESSURE ON TRAFFICKERS IN THE AIR, ON THE LAND AND AT SEA. MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED REMARKS. I WOULD BE HAPPY TO

RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU OR THE OTHER MEMBERS
MAY HAVE.

THANK YOU.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me thank both of you.

First, Mr. McDermott, did you accompany the Commissioner at the hearing before the Ways and Means Committee on the question of overtime?

Mr. McDERMOTT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. RANGEL. Share with the Commissioner that the Ways and Means Committee will be taking a critical look at the 1911 law. And it would seem to me that there is a perception of abuse, but there is no question that it is a legal method to compensate the Customs inspectors. I asked her to consider putting together an overall compensation package that would provide for comparable pay and pensions with other law enforcement Federal agencies.

And I think it would be very, very helpful to the Congress and the committee if we can get some general direction.

As I said, both of your departments are held in high esteem by the U.S. Congress. We respect the work that you are doing for us and we are pleased to see the cooperation has so improved between other agencies that have similar responsibilities, and the fact that DOD apparently is content to see that your historic obligations remain intact as they provide the support that is needed.

Soon we hope to be hearing from the secretaries of the Cabinet that have jurisdiction over your departments. It is not the Chair's intention to make you feel awkward, or embarrassed, but you might alert them that Secretary Brady has not really been an outspoken member of the Cabinet, as it relates to the drug problem, and neither has Secretary Skinner. It just seems to me that while the line agencies are doing a remarkably good job, that it does help, in terms of the morale of the country, and certainly, the intent of the Congress to support these efforts when the Secretary that has that responsibility speaks out.

Again, I am constantly reminded that the press does not always report the public statements that have been made by cabinet officials. If you can dig in your files and any press releases that are in there, and have not been adequately reported, this committee would be glad to introduce them into the Congressional Record, so when they do testify here, at least we would have a better understanding of their understanding of this international crisis and the threat to our national security.

Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What is your feeling of you having a responsibility for a portion of these units and the DOD the other portion?

Admiral LEAHY. Well, right now we are working with the Department of Defense to come up with a combined maintenance contract for all of the aerostats, in order to save the taxpayers a few dollars. I think we would be amenable to putting them all under one hat. I don't know what the policy is on it.

Mr. LEWIS. That's a very simple answer, I don't know why I didn't get that before.

Do you know if the system is up and operating now?

Admiral LEAHY. If the system is up and operating?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, do we have all of the aerostats operating and the radars operating at this point, do you know?

Admiral LEAHY. Ours are up and operating. I can't—

Mr. LEWIS. Yours are?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir. I can't give you a report on the rest of them though. We have two online and one coming online next year in the Bahamas, and two more along the Gulf of Mexico.

Mr. LEWIS. OK. That will complete the surveillance activity—complete the system, I believe.

Admiral LEAHY. We are going to have a total of eight, I believe, three in the Bahamas and five more long the gulf coast.

Mr. LEWIS. I am familiar with the locations.

I would like a comment from you, admiral, and also Mr. McDermott, on how the C3I communication system is operating and what are some of the strengths and weaknesses of the system that you see right now.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Yes, sir.

The C3I is a communication network, a coordination network, and intelligence with the various agencies involved in Florida, as well as the southwest border. It recently acquired the marine function as well, where we brought the Blue Lightning Operations Center together. It is a coordination effort, from an operational standpoint, with the military, as well as State and local law enforcement, to acquire targets that are heading for our border and take appropriate action.

I think it is working extremely well.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, we know what the system does.

Mr. McDermott, do you know of any weaknesses in the system right now that need to be upgraded at this point?

Mr. McDERMOTT. As far as we are concerned, it is functioning very well. We are always looking for obvious enhancements, we are always looking to upgrade the systems. But we are satisfied with its operation.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, let me ask you another question, Mr. McDermott. We have a system along the southeast coast called "roof top radar," and I am sure you were briefed before you came here—you knew I was going to be here and I was going to ask this question.

I would like to know why a few years ago it was so important to keep it in the Customs budget, and then 1½ years later you wanted to dismantle the system? If you dismantle the system how do you feel that that is going to—how are you going to replace that activity in the interdiction system?

Mr. McDERMOTT. Well, we are not dealing with the same threat that we were dealing with several years ago, the first point.

We also have acquired additional radars and sophisticated aircraft to avoid the gap from those condo radars that existed. It is something that we feel has outlived its usefulness and we are more effective with the other equipment that we have to fill that void.

Mr. LEWIS. Have you removed the system? Is it out of service now?

Mr. McDERMOTT. For the most part the system has been phased out. There are four additional pieces of equipment that are due to be pulled out in July.

Mr. LEWIS. And you think the NOMAD aircraft can fill this void?

Mr. McDERMOTT. As well as the aerostat because we are facing airdrop situations now. We feel with the aerostat coverage we have

forced most of the smuggling down to more than 150 miles off our coast.

Mr. LEWIS. How is the aerostat going to detect something up on the southeast coast? How is that going to work? I thought the aerostats were aimed in another direction.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Well, it has a range of 300 miles, and much of that is covered by the aerostat. What is not covered by the aerostat is covered by the aircraft that we employ.

Mr. LEWIS. OK. And you say this system has now been partially dismantled?

Mr. McDERMOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, I recognize the need for changing systems as times change, as Secretary Duncan pointed out, and as time goes on and we get better equipment, but I would like to ask a very basic question about this. I remember when this stuff was part of this operation. I know how hot everybody was for it, and almost overnight, it was changed. It wasn't up to design, it was 12 miles, instead of 36 and things of that nature.

But when we are dealing with an interdiction program and we have a problem trying to determine how we are going to replace it and things like that, and we also know the type of people that we are operating with, why do we release to the press that we are going to remove this local radar system from activity?

Mr. McDERMOTT. I can't answer that. I don't know why it was released to the press. I can get an official response for you, but I am not—

Mr. LEWIS. I don't want an official response, because I think it was a stupid maneuver. But, nonetheless, we have enough trouble trying to tell these people—or make sure these people don't know what we are doing, so why do we release to the press?

Quite frankly, the press called me to ask me why it was being dismantled. And I thought that was very interesting. It just didn't make good sense to me.

My time is up, unfortunately. I would like to pursue this a little bit further.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Inhofe yields to Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman. I just have basically two questions.

Admiral, I would like to know how the process works in having Coast Guard on Navy vessels? And you have found it works well, where the challenges are, and so on?

Admiral LEAHY. We have specific billets dedicated to the law enforcement detachments on the U.S. naval vessels that are dedicated to counternarcotics. We also put them on "transits of opportunity." If, in fact, a vessel is going from Norfolk to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and we have a LEDET available, we may put them on there, even though that vessel is not particularly assigned to the JTF-4. This system works very well.

I just came from the Pacific Coast where we had four Navy ships under our tactical control [TACON]. The Coast Guard people are on there and when they come upon a vessel that they are going to board, they shift the TACON to whatever Coast Guard district or area that they are located in. They do that boarding under Coast

Guard auspices and the Navy ship is under TACON control of the Coast Guard district. They complete the boarding and then they shift back to the tactical control of the JTF.

Mr. SHAYS. One of my concerns has been—let me first state that I felt the military, the non-Coast Guard could do more in drug interdiction. But I didn't want it to dilute from the effort of the Coast Guard.

Are you finding that you are not getting the resources that you used to get because we are spreading them out?

Admiral LEAHY. No, I think we have the resources that we need to carry out our mission.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. McDermott, the cross designation of Customs agents with DEA officials, what does it really allow you to accomplish? And why are we doing this?

Mr. McDERMOTT. It allows us to pursue post- and pre-interdiction type investigations beyond the border itself.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask this question—it points out my ignorance, but it seems to me that the DEA—at one time at Customs drugs were a small part of their responsibility. Is it fair to say that your responsibilities now, because of drugs, are the dominant area for Customs?

Mr. McDERMOTT. No, sir, we have several mutual priority areas, from the enforcement standpoint. Drugs have always been a priority relative to interdiction. But we have been able to evolve interdiction into further investigation. In other words, rather than taking off the person, the mule, that brings it across the border, by immediate action we are able to take it to several levels higher and remove the entire organizational structure, in many situations.

We recently had a case that moved from across the Arizona border into California, and then on to New York, where we were able to take down a whole trucking company and a whole organization which was involved in east coast distribution of cocaine.

Mr. SHAYS. And the DEA was involved in that effort?

Mr. McDERMOTT. DEA was involved in the effort with us, but the ability to do that and the decisions that had to be made operationally needed to be made immediately, at the time of the apprehension and interdiction. And we were able to fold immediately into phase two, which was in this case a cooperating individual.

In some cases possibly, what we refer to as a monitoring case, where they would come across the border and we would let it go, until we got to the next location, and be able to take the organization down there.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, I get the feeling that there has been a lot better coordination among all the different military units and agencies involved in our drug effort. And as someone who has been watching this as a Congressman now and observing it, and being involved in this committee, it is a very pleasing thing. I hope it is for real, but it appears to be a very constructive thing. And I just encourage it to continue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am done.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me turn the gavel over to Ron de Lugo.

But before I leave to respond to the legislative bells, I want to thank both of you for the outstanding job that your respective agencies are doing. And you should feel very comfortable in calling

upon this committee, if you think we can be of any assistance to you.

Admiral LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Coughlin is here.

Will you be remaining, Larry?

Mr. COUGHLIN. Well, I have to go over and vote shortly.

Mr. RANGEL. OK.

Then why don't I yield to Mr. Coughlin, and then when Mr. Coughlin finishes, then you can conclude the hearing.

Thank you, again.

Mr. Coughlin.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. de Lugo.

I have just two brief questions, if I may.

Mr. McDermott, you tell us that airdrops are still the preferred method of marine smuggling organizations. Why is it that the traffickers rely on air transport to such a great extent? Do you have any feelings about that?

Why is air transport the preferred method of getting drugs in?

Mr. McDERMOTT. Well, first of all, it is rapid. When our borders are unprotected, or the risk is less to cross our borders, the quickest way to get from one point to another is by airplane. And I might add, that prior to the employment of the radar detection, the aerostats and the sophisticated aircraft that we have, that was our greatest threat, that was the greatest threat relative to narcotics along our borders, was aircraft actually landing here.

We have pushed them back. This is a method—when they fly out of the source countries and drop their loads to offload boats in the Caribbean and elsewhere, this is not a method that they would choose. This requires a tremendous amount of logistics and coordination on their part. And the failure rate for them is fairly high, as well as the apprehension rate is greater for them.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Let me ask Admiral Leahy, has the Coast Guard captured a drug pilot, or a drug trafficking plane in the last year?

Admiral LEAHY. No, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have we had any success in passing off drug trafficking planes to Colombian, or Venezuelan authorities on their return trip from a drug drop in the Caribbean, or elsewhere?

Admiral LEAHY. I think between us and Customs, when the aircraft come up from Colombia, they are coming over monitored airspace, and if they are a suspected narcotics aircraft and are so designated, interceptors are launched, either from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or probably Borinquen, a Coast Guard HU-25, or a Customs Cessna Citation. In fact, if that aircraft gets up, drops, or aborts and heads back, the aircraft passes back through monitored airspace, so they should be detected.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Have we succeeded in passing off any planes to Colombian or Venezuelan authorities on their return trip, that you are aware of?

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir. However, this phase of the operation is conducted by DOD as part of the detection and monitoring function.

Mr. COUGHLIN. To your knowledge, do those Andean nations have the capability to track where drug trafficking planes land, or reach the site in time to arrest drug traffickers?

Admiral LEAHY. An adequate discussion of this topic would be classified, and I would defer to the Department of State as lead on this issue.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for the fact that I have had to be at an Appropriations Committee meeting where we were discussing the question of funding for the drug prevention effort. So, we are trying to do double duty here.

Let me turn it back over to Mr. de Lugo.

Mr. DE LUGO [presiding]. I thank you. And of course, the gentleman, as the ranking member on the Republican side here, is certainly one of the most dedicated and valued members of this committee.

Recently, the chairman sent staff from this committee to visit the various areas in the Caribbean, Florida, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, to see how the Coast Guard, Customs, and the other agencies were operating, how successful we were in those areas.

And as we are all aware, the push seems to have moved from Florida, because of the success in Florida, down to the Caribbean. And I want to open my statement by, first of all, commending the Coast Guard for the agency, or the task force that they set up, that operates in Puerto Rico, under GANTSEC. The Coast Guard is the center of this organization and then you have the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the commander, Caribbean Squadron, Joint Task Force 4, the Customs Service, Immigration, Forces United for Rapid Action, the Commonwealth Police of Puerto Rico, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Marine Fisheries. And we show here the Virgin Islands Territorial Police, they are shown on the chart, but they are not involved. They are simply not involved.

These meetings take place every day. They have been, according to my information, extremely successful in the Commonwealth, but we don't have that type of operation in the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands is, in fact, not actively participating in this.

And, you know, every law enforcement agent that I speak to, they will tell you that in the final analysis, we can't be successful, unless we get down to the policemen, the local law enforcement people. That is where we get a lot of our intelligence information and they are the ones that are dealing with it.

Now, you have described the airdrops. And I have seen the results of those airdrops, I see it all the time because you are forcing the drug lords to drop their drugs at sea and they wash up on our beaches. I mean, we have had time and time again these huge caches of drugs wash up on the beaches. They also try to bring them in sometimes by speed boats.

But recently the price on cocaine has gone down, which would indicate that a lot of drugs are still getting in. If they are not coming in with the planes, they must be coming in some other way. And it would appear to me that there are a lot of cruise boats in the Virgin Islands.

To what degree do you think the cruise boats are being used to get drugs into the United States?

I will address that to Mr. McDermott.

Mr. McDERMOTT. Sir, I believe that that is an accurate assessment. I believe that not only the cruise boats, but also the cargo vessels traveling from those areas.

But one of the things that you pointed out is that some of these loads of narcotics are washing up on the shore. And I think that demonstrates that that is not the best method to smuggle into the United States.

Mr. DE LUGO. No question, no question.

Mr. McDERMOTT. However, what we are doing in response to that, some of the things that we are doing to try to bring this together is we are starting to implement the Blue Lightning Task Force concept in the Virgin Islands. And we will be putting additional resources, additional investigators, agents down there to respond to this particular threat.

Mr. DE LUGO. Use undercover agents, for instance, on the cruise boats?

Mr. McDERMOTT. In many situations that is a method that we use, as well as people to get the information, intelligence-generated type of information, to be at the right place at the right time. The marine and air operations both require a great deal of information flow, otherwise you are either spending a lot of time in the large ocean, or a lot of time in the air without any targets. That is what we are concentrating on doing right now, in bringing the same type of concept that exists in south Florida, to the Virgin Islands for the coordinating mechanism.

Mr. DE LUGO. Does Customs plan to dismantle the radar facility at Quinta Selinas? It is the only one that is now capable of covering the Virgin Islands area.

I might point out, before you answer, that the aerostat balloon that there has been quite a lot of talk about, the one for Puerto Rico that was due online, I think, this month, will not cover the waters east or southeast of the Virgin Islands, where we understand most of the drugs are coming through at the present time.

Mr. McDERMOTT. We don't plan on dismantling that operation. We plan on using the aerostat to enhance the area of coverage. But the areas that aren't covered will go to the ground-type—have the ground-type radar.

Mr. DE LUGO. OK. Mr. McDermott, in your statement you said, and you restated just now, that you plan to get the Virgin Islands Blue Lightning Strike Force up to speed. And, may I ask, when is that going to be done?

Mr. McDERMOTT. Yes. It has already been in operation. The final aspects of it, the coordination, moving the agencies that are going to participate in it are in the working process right now. A lot depends on us moving the additional resources down there, which we feel we desperately need.

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you.

You know, with all of these problems that are cropping up in the small independent nations of the Caribbean, such as Dominica and Saint Kitts, all the way down the line, how are the ship rider

agreements with other Caribbean countries, how are they coming along? Are we making any progress?

I guess that should go to Admiral Leahy.

Admiral LEAHY. We have an agreement with the British Virgin Islands. We have an agreement with the Bahamians and Panama. And, we are in the process of negotiating with the Venezuelans. I don't believe we have anymore ongoing at this time, sir.

Mr. DE LUGO. More and more there seems to be increased activity through the British Virgin Islands toward the U.S. Virgin Islands, because, you know, once you are that close, if they make it to Puerto Rico, they are in the United States, you might as well be in New York, or next door, because they are inside the Customs wall.

Are there plans to have representatives from the British Virgin Islands Government, that you would have more patrols? I think at the present time there is only one patrol every 2 months.

Admiral LEAHY. I am not sure of the exact frequency of the patrol. I thought they were more frequent than that.

Mr. DE LUGO. That would be a patrol with a British Virgin Islands representative on board.

Admiral LEAHY. Yes, sir. I thought they were more frequent than that.

Mr. DE LUGO. Our information is that there is only one every 2 months. I would like to be corrected, if that is not so, for the record.

But let's assume that you think that you will be looking at the possibility of increasing that, since I believe that is very useful to the drug fight?

Admiral LEAHY. I will certainly bring it up to the operational commander down there, sir.

Admiral Leahy's response below was added subsequent to the hearing.

However, we currently enjoy two types of cooperative agreements with the British. Operation Ocean Tracker includes the British Navy's West Indies Guard Ship and other transiting British Navy vessels who conduct counternarcotics detection and monitoring operations. A Coast Guard liaison officer will be aboard the British vessel(s) during the operations. Sometimes, a Coast Guard boarding detachment will also be on board, and frequently Coast Guard cutters will participate in the joint operations. During the first three quarters of FY-91, 82 such operations have been conducted in the Caribbean providing a patrol presence 30 percent of the time. The second agreement authorizes British Virgin Island (BVI) shipriders to ride on board U.S. Coast Guard vessels in BVI waters to assist in their enforcement of BVI laws. During the first three quarters of FY-91, we have conducted seven such operations.

Mr. DE LUGO. I want to commend—I don't know if I did it, but I want to commend Captain Blaney, who set that up 3 years ago, and he has done an outstanding job. I understand he is moving up and we are sorry to see him leave the area. But his replacement, Captain McGee, came by to see me, he is going to be taking over and we wish him every success.

Admiral LEAHY. Thank you.

Mr. DE LUGO. How about the authority to share intelligence information with the British Virgin Islands and the other Caribbean Basin Initiative countries, have you made any progress on that?

Admiral LEAHY. I am not exactly sure what they are sharing with us, sir. I know that they are sharing some information through the law enforcement network set up in GANTSEC.

Mr. DE LUGO. Thank you.

Well, during today's hearing we have—and there is no question that many levels, particularly the top levels, that there has been a great increase in cooperation between the various Federal agencies, but you heard me say earlier that at our level, down in the U.S. Virgin Islands, that is not reflected.

I understand that in Puerto Rico the cooperation is very good. But in the Virgin Islands at the present time it is not. It is not between certain Federal agencies, we have the old turf problems between Federal agencies. We have problems between local agencies and Federal agencies. And that has to be overcome, we have got to do the job. I would hope that we would be able to focus on the U.S. Virgin Islands and do the job in the Virgin Islands that was done over in Puerto Rico, because we are getting walloped with the impact of these drugs. They have brought a level of violence to our community, they are impacting the school children, something that if anyone had told me 5 years ago could have happened, I would have told them it was impossible.

So we are very serious down there about wanting to beat this problem. And I hope that you will pass this word along and see if we can get a setup similar to Puerto Rico.

I think that really covers all of our main points. And I would like to ask about that aerostat that was due online in Puerto Rico in June, do we know when that is going to come online?

Mr. McDERMOTT. It will be up for operational testing this month. And we hope to go through that process and then have it online. We are anxious to see it.

Mr. DE LUGO. Well, you know, as Chairman Rangel said, both of your agencies are viewed around Congress as the pets of Congress. And it is because you do a helluva good job. And we feel very good when we put the taxpayers' money toward an agency and they deliver for the taxpayers. And that's what you have been doing.

I have pointed out some of the areas where we need help in my particular district. And I certainly hope that both of you will help me to get that help.

But certainly the increase in the efficiency of the war on drugs that we have seen in the last few years has been very encouraging.

I want to thank you all for being here today. And with that, the committee's hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

